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Cash is an important means of transaction, generally assumed to be fungible. However,
behavioral economics and consumer research show that ‘cash in hand’, physically holding
on to cash and then handing it away, affects purchasing decisions. I study how cash in
hand influences decisions in a different but very important domain: savings. Savings ac-
counts are a promising tool for reducing poverty, but the use of savings accounts is often
puzzlingly low. Holding on to cash that needs to be physically deposited into a savings
account may increase the psychological costs of saving. This study experimentally iden-
tifies the causal effect of cash in hand on savings deposits of microfinance clients in the
Philippines. In contrast to many laboratory and several field studies with similar interven-
tions, I do not find reduced savings deposits due to cash in hand. I discuss reasons for and
consequence of this surprising finding, in particular for developing economics where lots
of transactions are still cash-based.
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1 Introduction
Half of the world population uses only cash (Demirguc-Kunt et al. 2018). The standard as-
sumption regarding cash is that it is fully fungible. Yet, economic research has shown in vari-
ous contexts that fungibility can be reduced by labeling (e.g. Abeler and Marklein 2017; Hast-
ings and Shapiro 2013; Kooreman 2000) or by ‘cash in hand’, i.e. physically holding on to cash
and handing it away (e.g. Luccasen and Grossman 2018; Reinstein and Riener 2012). Regard-
ing cash in hand, both experimental (Prelec and Simester 2001; Soman 2003) as well as survey
evidence (Mercatanti and Li 2014) suggests that cash payments are lower than payments with
other means of transactions. The evidence on violations of fungibility, both due to labeling and
cash in hand, stems from high income countries. However, the fraction of the population that
uses only cash is very small there (9 percent), as compared to developing countries in which
more than half of the population relies exclusively on cash transactions (Demirguc-Kunt et al.
2018).
In a natural setting dominated by cash, this paper investigates the causal effect of cash
in hand on savings deposits. While labels have been studied and used to reduce fungibility
and thus increase savings (e.g. Dupas and Robinson 2013b), cash in hand effects have so far
not been studied in the domain of savings. The physical deposit of cash might reduce or even
inhibit the use of savings accounts and other savings institutions and thus help explain low
savings rates.1 Despite positive effects of savings on poverty reduction2, formal savings rates
remain low in developing countries: while 61% of the population in developing countries have
a financial institution account, only 21% save in it (Demirguc-Kunt et al. 2018). Reasons for this
are not fully understood (Karlan et al. 2014).
I experimentally study the effect of cash in hand on savings decisions of 300 microfi-
nance clients in the Philippines. I pay participants cash to take part in an interview, and then
allow them to deposit some of this payment in their savings accounts. To hold constant other
factors that might influence savings decisions, and to identify the causal effect of cash in hand
on savings decisions, I exogenously vary the point in time at which the participants receive the
cash. All participants know how much they will receive as this is publicly announced before
1Note that, by the same reasoning, savings at home might increase. However, given that the poor often face
requests by others to share cash if they have some (Kast and Pomeranz 2018), an increase in savings at home
appears to be unlikely. In this study, I focus on savings accounts since these have been shown to reduce poverty.
Even if the poor saved more under the mattress, it is important to understand why savings accounts are so little
used.
2Benefits of using savings accounts include an increase in business investment (Dupas and Robinson 2013a),
household consumption (Brune et al. 2016), financial well-being (Prina 2015), as well as female empowerment
(Ashraf et al. 2010), and a reduction in debt (Kast and Pomeranz 2018).
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the start of the individual interviews. In the Cash in Hand (CiH) treatment, participants receive
the cash at the beginning of the interview, so that they hold the cash for about 15 minutes be-
fore deciding how much of it to deposit. In the Cash Announced (CA) treatment, participants
decide how much to put in the savings account before receiving the cash. Participants in CiH
thus hold on to cash and hand over the amount they want to save, whereas individuals in CA
verbally state the amount they want to save.
The main hypothesis is that cash in hand decreases savings deposits. In this experiment
and in real life, the cash in hand effect consists of two components: first, holding on to cash at
the time of decision making and second, handing over the cash. These two mechanisms have
separately been shown to have effects on purchasing decisions. In particular, my treatment
variation builds on experimental laboratory studies that find i) lower donations in the presence
of cash (Luccasen andGrossman 2018; Reinstein and Riener 2012), ii) lower spendingwith cash
as compared to card payments (Feinberg 1986; Prelec and Loewenstein 1998; Runnemark et al.
2015) and iii) stronger endowment effects if the item is physically present (Bushong et al. 2010;
Knetsch and Wong 2009; Peck and Shu 2009; Strahilevitz and Loewenstein 1998). Similar to i)
and iii), the CiH treatment variation alters the physical presence of cash and the way in which
the transaction is made. In contrast to ii), the means of transaction and thus the representation
of money is held constant which allows a clean identification of cash in hand effects.
I find that cash in hand does not alter savings decisions. On average, participants
save 42% of their experimental earnings, and both the means and the distributions of savings
amounts are identical in CiH and CA. This null finding is robust to a cross-randomized varia-
tion in stake size. Given the extensive literature discussed in more detail below that employs
similar manipulations, this is an interesting null result. The absence of a significant effect is
neither driven by an ineffective manipulation nor by excessive noise. In addition to relying on
an established treatment variation, I also provide evidence that participants in CiHwho physi-
cally hold on to cash feel richer than those inCA: Before learning about the opportunity to save,
participants in CiH state half a daily wage higher cash holdings at the end of the day than the
individuals in CA. Since the sample is balanced in terms of observables, this difference in per-
ceived income appears to be driven by the treatment manipulation. Moreover, the null finding
is robust to different estimation techniques and specifications. The lack of treatment effect het-
erogeneity further supports that a cash in hand effect does not exist in this setting. Lastly, the
effect is quite tightly estimated, as under conventional power and significance thresholds, the
minimal detectable effect size is 10% of the experimental earnings or 0.3 standard deviations
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of the savings decisions (which I benchmark against other studies with similar interventions).
This allows ruling out an economically relevant effect.
The experimental method and the study design of this paper have several advantages.
First, given the multiplicity of explanations for the low level of the use of savings accounts,
it is impossible to infer the cash in hand effect from observational data. An experimental
setup offers the unique opportunity to identify the causal effect. Second, the design excludes
alternative (and previously studied) explanations for low savings in CiH such as temptation
to spend the money, transaction costs or inertia in decision making. This allows me to cleanly
estimate the cash in hand effect. Third, all participants receive at least some of their income in
cash and they already have a savings account, so that the experiment takes place in a natural
setting with participants who have experience with the decision. Lastly, studying the clients of
a microfinance organization that grants me access to administrative data, allows me to show
that the experimental savings decision is correlated with actual (pre-experimental) savings
behavior. The administrative data also permit investigating (and ruling out) selection into the
experimental sample.
Providing a clean test of the cash in hand effect on savings decisions in a comparatively
large sample, this study contributes to consumer research and experimental economics. Both
fields have so far focused on the effect of cash on spending decisions. Consumer research
investigates how in cash transactions, parting with money is something vividly felt, which
induces a high level of ’pain of paying’ (Prelec and Simester 2001; Soman 2003; Thaler 1999).
Consequently, consumers spend less when paying with cash than when using other means of
payment (Feinberg 1986; Prelec and Loewenstein 1998; Runnemark et al. 2015). In experimen-
tal economics, cash in hand (as compared to a display of a sum on a computer screen) has been
found to lead to lower charitable donations in the laboratory (Luccasen and Grossman 2018;
Reinstein and Riener 2012), to lower participation and fewer investments in an experimental
game (Shen and Takahashi 2017) and for punishment to be more deterrent (Wang and Qin
2015). All these findings are consistent with higher psychological costs when cash is handed
away physically.3 Using an actual, real-life transaction and a comparatively large sample, this
study shows that this phenomenon is not universal and suggests that it varies with the context
of the decision.
3In several of the above cited studies, the cash in hand or pain of paying effect even emerges when the cash
transaction is only anticipated as the decision is made before the transaction.
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This paper is the first to address the explanatory power of cash in hand effects in sav-
ings decisions, and demonstrates that they are unlikely to be of first-order importance as an
explanation for low savings rates. It thereby contributes to a growing body of research in
developing countries that tries to explain undersaving as compared to a world without insti-
tutional and behavioral frictions.4 Most interventions tackling behavioral factors have focused
on time-inconsistent decision making and/or inattention, providing some form of commit-
ment device or reminders, which have resulted in mostly modest uptake (21%-40%) and usage
rates (9%-21%) (Ashraf et al. 2006a,b, 2010; Brune et al. 2016; Karlan et al. 2017). Cash in hand
effects could explain the pattern found in most of these studies. For example, two recent field
experiments compare defaulting payments into a savings account to handing out payments
in cash (Brune et al. 2017; Somville and Vandewalle 2018). Both studies find distinctly higher
savings with automatic deposits, which could be due to e.g. inertia in decision making or small
transaction costs.5 Yet, the results are also consistent with a cash in hand effect decreasing sav-
ings deposits. As transaction costs and inertia are held constant in my experiment, my findings
suggest that cash in hand is not an important driver of savings deposits in these studies and in
savings more generally.6
This study’s design is closely related to endowment effect studies in the laboratory (cf.
Ericson and Fuster 2014) and employs a similar treatment manipulation in a relevant field
setting. The manipulation of this study relies on findings showing that endowment effects are
stronger when the item is physically present (Bushong et al. 2010; Knetsch and Wong 2009;
Peck and Shu 2009; Strahilevitz and Loewenstein 1998). Moreover, the time spent with cash
in hand in my experiment is the upper bound of the time that, in laboratory experiments,
the participants spend with their endowment. This study shows that 15 minutes are not only
sufficient to induce endowment effects for goods, but that the physical presence of cash for this
time makes individuals feel richer. Conceptually, however, the cash in hand effect in savings
4In many cases, low formal savings do not seem to be exclusively driven by liquidity constraints and being
too poor to save (Banerjee and Duflo 2007). In addition to direct savings costs such as transaction costs, regulatory
barriers, and social constraints, explanations have focused on behavioral biases such as time-inconsistent decision
making and inattention (Ashraf et al. 2006a,b, 2010; Brune et al. 2016; Dupas and Robinson 2013b; Karlan et al.
2017).
5More generally, defaults that make use of e.g. automatic payroll deductions in developing (Blumenstock et
al. 2018) and developed countries (Thaler and Benartzi 2004) appear to be a powerful tool to increase savings.
However, they cannot be applied in settings that mostly rely on cash transactions and in which infrastructure for
digital financial payments is lacking or not in use.
6In addition, this study also helps discern which features of savings deposits influence savings behavior. Hari-
gaya (2017) shows that changing from deposits with account officers during regular meetings to deposits at one’s
own discretion with agents at corner stores, led to a decline in both savings balances and the frequency of deposits.
This was mainly driven by lower peer pressure and the increased salience of the transaction fees. While the cash
transaction was not altered in his study, the present study suggests that cash transactions do not inhibit savings.
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decisions differs from the endowment effect. Endowment effects are usually described in terms
of trading of goods (vs. money), while this study investigates ’trading’ of cash now vs. cash in
the future.7 Despite physically handing over the cash, the money saved is still owned, which
is not the case for traded goods. While my treatment changes the perception of wealth, it does
not lead to overall changes in behavior.
The policy relevance of cash in hand effects is not limited to the use of savings accounts.
Given the wide-spread use of cash, it is important to further understand the role cash plays
in economic decisions more generally. This is especially true in light of the recent policy de-
bate in both developing and developed countries regarding a (faster) transition to a cashless
economy.Yet, beyond labeling and cash in hand, surprisingly little is known about whether
and how cash itself influences decision making. For policy design, however, it is important to
understand in which instances fungibility is reduced due to behavioral responses. Why does
cash in hand influence spending, but not saving decisions? This paper calls into question the
universality of cash in hand effects and points to interesting avenues for future research to
better understand cash and its influence on decision-making.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows: Section 2 introduces the research
design, including the data sources, setting, sampling, and procedures. Section 3 presents the
results, and discusses power, the treatment manipulation, treatment effect heterogeneity, as
well as ecological validity and representativeness of the sample. Section 4 discusses potential
reasons for absence of a cash in hand effect, and Section 5 concludes.
2 Research design
2.1 Data sources
I use a mixture of a controlled environment and a field setting, in which I observe actual sav-
ings decisions of a relevant population and randomly assign the presence of cash at the time of
decision making. Embedding the savings decision in an interview allows me to collect a rich
set of background characteristics.8 I am able to link the interview data – collected on tablets
during the sessions – to administrative data of weekly savings deposits and withdrawals as
well as some basic demographics, including a poverty measure collected at the time of the
7So far, endowment effects for cash have only been studied in the lab. While Bateman et al. (2005) find endow-
ment effects for cash when trading for goods, Svirsky (2014) detects no endowment effect for cash when offered
the possibility of exchanging it for other cash now. In the field, the most fungible ’item’ that have been found to
inhibit endowment effects are company shares (Anagol et al. 2018).
8The questionnaire can be found in Appendix I.2.
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last loan application. This allows me to assess how the experimental savings decision relates
to savings behavior outside the experiment. An explanation of the variables can be found in
Appendix J.
2.2 Setting and sampling
To ensure that I sample from a relevant population (who receive their income in cash), I work
with clients from the Filipino microfinance organization Ahon Sa Hirap (ASHI), who provide
financial services to poor women. Clients join the partner MFI to borrow for productive pur-
poses, but when joining, the MFI also automatically opens a savings account for them.9 The
account offers an interest rate of four percent p.a. if a balance of at least 500 Philippine peso ( P )
is maintained over a duration of twelve months.10 While the combination of saving and bor-
rowing might seem counter-intuitive, it is a widespread practice in microfinance settings (Ar-
mendáriz and Morduch 2010) and in this particular case, the two are complements rather than
substitutes: Early down-payments of the loan are not possible, so savings can serve as an in-
surance against potential future shocks and resulting repayment problems. Moreover, loans
are usually taken to invest into one’s own business, whereas participants state that emergen-
cies (58 percent) and education (38 percent; up to three answers possible) are the main savings
goals. The approval of loans does not depend on the savings balance or any savings behavior.
Clients usually self-select into groups of five and apply together to become members of
the MFI. Two to eight of these borrower groups from the same neighborhood form a ‘center’
and meet weekly in a designated place to publicly conduct all transactions with the MFI in
cash. Attending the weekly center meetings is mandatory and non-excused absences results
in lower credit ratings. The marginal transaction cost of using the savings account is thus zero,
as clients attend the meeting and can just deposit (or withdraw) savings. In addition, since all
clients have an account by default, the hassle costs of opening an account do not matter in this
setting.
The majority of participants are self-employed (73 percent own a business). Eighty
percent receive at least half and 59 percent receive all their income in cash. While mobile
banking has progressed significantly in other countries, its coverage in the Philippines remains
quite low, with only 11 out of 467 rural banks offering electronic banking facilities (one rural
9This is not necessarily true for all microfinance clients. Yet, since clients do not join theMFI to save, my sample
is still comparable to the clients of other MFIs.
10 P 500 corresponds to about 2.5 times the average daily wages of the sample population, and were worth €9.38
(US$ 9.96) at the time of the experiment. The inflation rate in the Philippines was about 2.5 percent.
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bank offers mobile banking) in the first half of 2017, and this is unlikely to change soon (Central
Bank of the Philippines 2017). As of 2017, only 5 percent of the population had a mobile money
account and 25 percent used digital payments (Demirguc-Kunt et al. 2018). The Philippines
thus constitute a setting in which the implications of cash transactions will remain relevant at
least in the medium run.
Three branches of the partner MFI were selected based on their geographical proximity,
to minimize the travel times for the research team. Within each branch, centers were selected
based on meeting times and distance from each other, so that two centers could be visited per
day. Section 3.7 provides evidence that this procedure did not result in a selected sample, and
Figure K.1 in the Appendix shows the location of the centers. The selection of the participants
in the sample centers is closely linked to the experimental procedures, and is hence described
in Section 2.4.
2.3 Experimental design
The experiment is embedded in a paid individual interview, which consists of three parts (see
Appendix I.2 for details). The first part of the interview comprises questions regarding per-
sonal characteristics, the composition of the household, its financial situation, and personal
business activities. Part 2 contains an incentivized elicitation of risk and time preferences as
well as loss aversion. Part 3 includes survey questions regarding savings behavior, financial
literacy, and hypothetical questions on narrow bracketing and attention to finances.
The experiment consists of a cash payment for participation in the interview and an
unannounced savings decision. At the end of Part 1, participants are asked whether they want
to save (some of) their earnings in their existing savings account. Before making the decision,
participants are informed that if the amount saved is still in the account after four weeks, it
will be matched with 20 percent. This match is added to the savings account by the research
team; it has been employed to induce sufficient savings and to reduce potential influences of
time preferences.
Two treatments are implemented in a 2×2 between-subject design. The main treatment
dimension varies ’cash in hand’: Individuals receive the cash payment for participation either
at the beginning of the interview or after the savings decision. Table 1 illustrates how much
cash participants in CiH and CA hold during each part of the interview. Participants in CiH
hold on to the cash during the first part. Treated participants thus make the savings decision
by handing over (parts of) their cash holdings to the interviewer. In contrast, participants in
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CA make the savings decision without holding the money in their hands, but knowing that
they will receive the remainder of their earnings just after making the savings decision. They
verbally state the amount they want to save. The second treatment dimension tests for income
effects by varying the earnings amount to be either P 300 or P 500 (1.5 or 2.5 times the average
daily wage).
Table 1: Timing of Cash Holding during the Interview (Main Treatment Manipulation)
Cash that participant holds
Minutes Activity CiH Treatment CA Treatment
Receive cash E
0:00 Part 1: General survey E 0
15:00 Savings decision S E 0
Hand back S Verbally state S
Receive cash E-S
17:00 Part 2: Preference elicitation E-S E-S
25:00 Part 3: Savings survey E-S E-S
40:00 End: Preference payouts E-S (+X) E-S (+X)
Notes: E denotes the earnings received for participating in the interview ( P 300 or 500), S the amount
saved, and X the potential payoffs from experimental preference elicitation.
The structure of the interview serves two main purposes: First, it provides the possibil-
ity of controlling for potential spillover effects from the treatment onto the preference elicita-
tion (i.e. subjects in CiH save less and thus are richer in Part 2, which in turn might alter their
decisions). Cassidy (2019), for instance, shows experimentally that liquidity constraints can
result in higher elicited present bias. Giving everyone the remainder of their earnings before
the elicitation reduces this concern. Still, all questions, even those in Parts 2 and 3, can po-
tentially be influenced by the treatment manipulation if CiH leads to lower savings and thus
larger cash holdings in Parts 2 and 3. On the one hand, I make use of this feature to show that
the manipulation worked and that participants in CiH feel richer by comparing answers from
Part 1 in CiH and CA, as explained in Section 3.4. On the other hand, I show that the answers
in Part 3 are the same for the two groups (see Table 2), and use administrative data, where
possible, to check that the respondents’ answers to the interview questions are reliable and not
influenced by the treatment (see Appendix H). Second, asking savings-related questions only
in Part 3 prevents priming participants before the experimental savings decision. The decision
to save is the first time savings are mentioned in either the session and the interviews.
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2.4 Procedural details
Announcement of interviews One week before the session took place in a selected center, all
the clients in the center received an announcement letter, informing them of the possibility of
taking part in paid individual interviews that would earn at least P 300. This announcement
serves to establish trust, as the sessions will take part as described in the announcement.11
Further, it might create a reference point of P 300 for participation.12
Recruitment of participants Each session took place on the announced day during theweekly
center meeting and started at the beginning of themeeting tomake sure the interviews finished
within the typical duration of the meeting (1.5-2 hours). At the beginning of each session, the
research team was briefly introduced and the expected duration of an interview (40 minutes)
was stated before the clients could volunteer to participate. From the pool of all volunteers,
ten participants were selected by a publicly drawn lottery. In all sessions, all present clients
volunteered to take part, so that selection of present clients into the sample is not a concern.
The number drawn in the lottery not only determined the participation but also the treatment
assignment – CiH or CA – and the interviewer.13
Randomization of treatments The two treatments are randomized on two different levels:
CiH is randomized at the individual level and all interviewers conducted interviews in both
treatments, balancing interviewer-specific effects. To rule out confusion of treatments, the
computer-based program of the questionnaire provided detailed scripts and required treatment-
specific entries (e.g. where cash in CiH is kept during Part 1). By relying on individual level
randomization of cash in hand, in combination with this particular setting, I can rule out other
potential explanations for undersaving (see also Section 4) and cleanly estimate the cash in
hand effect on savings decisions. The earnings amount is randomized at the session level and
11To further increase trust, the announcement letter was read out and distributed by the MFI, a trusted institu-
tion (96 percent of participants think their savings are safe with this MFI). A question during the interview checked
whether participants received the letter. While eight percent (7.3 percent) of participants in CiH (CA) stated not
having received it, these shares do not differ between the treatments (χ2, p = 0.828). The vast majority of partici-
pants can read and write (92 percent have at least completed elementary school) and are used to receiving written
documents from the MFI. The English translation of the letter can be found in Appendix I.1.
12While the announced earnings of P 300 might already have established a reference point or entered the partic-
ipants’ budget plans, the additional P 200 should be treated as a true windfall gain. Note that I cannot disentangle
the income effect (participants with P 500 are richer) from the surprise effect. The treatment necessary to disen-
tangle the two would have been an announcement of P 500, which in turn might have induced selection into the
sample. To rule out this selection, I opted for the present design.
13Randomization of interviewers avoids selection of interviewer–interviewee parings from either side. Random-
ization was done prior to the start of all sessions using Stata and the randomization protocol was implemented by
myself.
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was only announced after the recruitment, to avoid potential selection effects.14 Randomiza-
tion at the session level is necessary since the amount is publicly announced to increase trust.
Moreover, to avoid any denomination effects (see also Section 4), the different bills were dis-
played during the announcement of the amount.15 Pre-tests have shown that this establishes
trust in receiving the money.
Sessions and earnings Three hundred clients were interviewed in 31 different centers in
semi-urban and rural areas of the Laguna Province on the main island in the Philippines, Lu-
zon (see Figure K.1). Center meetings take place Monday to Thursday and usually start either
at 9am or at 1pm, resulting in two sessions per day, which were conducted in the spring of
2017. Each center was revisited four weeks after the initial session to deposit the match in the
savings account, when applicable. The average earnings from the sessions were P 417 (€7.82
or US$ 8.30), including payouts for survey participation and preference elicitation. 85 percent
of all participants (93 percent of those who saved) were eligible for the match and additionally
received the match payment after four weeks (more information in Table G.1).
Additional logistics A team of five local interviewers were trained to conduct the interviews
on Surface Pro tablets using z-tree (Fischbacher 2007). Selected participants were interviewed
one-on-one by a local interviewer in private. First, five participants were interviewed in one
round. Once these interviews were over, the next five interviews were conducted. Only two
rounds of interviews were conducted in each center to avoid information flow from those
already interviewed to the to-be-interviewed participants. Additionally, at the end of the in-
terview, all participants were asked not to talk about the details of the interview with others.
All questions and instructions were translated into the local language, Tagalog, (and back-
translated to English) and piloted before the start of the experiments. The study was approved
by the Ethics Commission, Department of Economics, LMU Munich (project 2016-13) and is
registered in the AEA RCT Registry (AEARCTR-0001870).
14Since I have an uneven number of centers in my sample, 15 centers received P 300 and 16 P 500. Cell sizes are
thus as follows: 73 (73) individuals in CiH (CA) with P 300 and 77 (77) in P 500.
15Participants in the P 300 treatment received the following notes: one 100, two 50 and five 20 peso bills. Partic-
ipants in the P 500 treatment received two 100, four 50 and five 20 peso bills. Individuals in CiH knew they could
change the bills into coins, but they did not receive coins, since the number of coins needed to make decisions in
P 1 steps was perceived as unnatural and even offensive during pre-testing. Participants in CiH did not request




Table 2 provides the results from OLS regressions with the treatment dummies as independent
variables, where CA300 is the omitted category. The dependent variables come from both the
interviews (self-reports) and administrative data.
Table 2: Balance
CA300 CiH300 CA500 CiH500 R
2 F-test
Self-Reports
Age 43.19 0.986 0.535 -1.532 0.001 0.945
Education (yrs) 8.712 -0.164 -0.102 0.450 0.003 0.718
Financial literacy (0-1) 0.514 0.027 0.077* -0.073 0.018 0.229
SR attention to finances (y/n) 0.274 -0.0685 -0.0792 0.146 0.008 0.471
MR attention to finances (y/n) 0.301 -0.0822 -0.0936 0.121 0.007 0.337
HH size 5.288 0.466 0.024 -0.687 0.011 0.529
Owns business (y/n) 0.658 0.082 0.109 -0.095 0.009 0.617
Cash income (y/n) 0.918 0.014 0.017 0.0123 0.004 0.577
Currently saving (y/n) 0.753 0.082 0.078 -0.108 0.007 0.473
Savings at home ( P ) 1,034 441.8 318.7 -662.1 0.005 0.606
Savings in account ( P ) 662.3 -16.17 364.5 -267.1 0.010 0.630
Travel cost to center ( P ) 0.685 -0.397 0.419 0.280 0.007 0.270
Travel time to center (min) 5.658 -0.164 0.680 0.489 0.006 0.788
Banks untrustworthy (0-1) 0.468 0.00548 -0.0555 0.00491 0.008 0.465
Savings in ASHI are safe (0-1) 0.932 0.0274 -0.0386 0.0408 0.018 0.297
Decision making power (0-1) 0.511 0.0522 0.000573 -0.0847* 0.013 0.155
Would like a private account (0-1) 0.616 0.0548 0.0394 -0.00285 0.006 0.611
Saving less due to...
...claims from husband 0.538 -0.00905 -0.00861 -0.0246 0.002 0.939
...claims from family & friends 0.168 0.0137 0.0108 -0.0689 0.006 0.589
Administrative Data
Savings balance ( P ) 764.9 64.35 2.396 -31.22 0.001 0.981
Loan amount ( P ) 23,722 1,014 -5,385* 355.1 0.035 0.105
PPI score (0-100) 43.42 1.556 -0.547 -1.492 0.002 0.916
Main income: Enterprise (y/n) 0.836 -0.0959 0.0865 -0.0470 0.032 0.656
Electricity (y/n) 0.458 0.0139 0.00920 -0.0281 0.000 0.992
Water (y/n) 0.153 0 -0.0229 0.0701 0.005 0.426
Landline (y/n) 0.0139 -0.0139 -0.0139 0.0272 0.007 .
Membership (months) 60.96 -1.219 -19.53 -5.209 0.052 0.130
Notes: The upper panel presents results for variables elicited during the experiment and
the lower panel variables from pre-experimental administrative data. Higher values indicate
larger agreement/better outcomes. Mean of the CA group and coefficients from OLS regres-
sions with treatment dummies as independent variables and clustered SE (not shown) at the
center level. The last column shows p-values of the F-test of joint significance of the treatment
dummies. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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The F -test of the treatment dummies jointly explaining the respective variables is al-
ways insignificant at the 10 percent level. The successful randomization permits simple non-
parametric comparisons of the treatments.
3.2 Main result: Savings deposits
Pooling the two earnings treatments, participants saved P 166.17 (SD: P 125.18) on average.16
This corresponds to 42 percent of the average experimental earnings. Holding on to cash for
on average 15 minutes and handing it over to save it did not alter the savings decisions (see





















Figure 1: Mean Amount Saved by Cash in Hand
Not only are the mean amounts saved the same in CiH and CA (for both earnings
amounts, respectively), but there is also no difference in the distribution of choices (see Fig-
ure 2, Kolmogorov-Smirnov test, p = 1, irrespective of pooling or testing the two earnings
amounts separately). Examining the distribution of amounts saved, it becomes apparent that
focal points exist for absolute amounts. This provides evidence that the participants thought
16Here I deviate from the pre-specified analysis that would have used the share saved (all results are reported
in the appendix). While the findings do not depend on this change, analyzing the amount saved is more intuitive,
as participants appear to think about the decision in absolute numbers.
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about the decision in absolute terms (see also the graph for shares of the earnings saved, Fig-
ure A.1 that does not show such clear patterns for certain round percentages). It is thus rather
unlikely that participants used a rule of thumb, such as ’save 40 percent of earnings’, which





























Figure 2: Distributions of Amount Saved
Using OLS regressions, I control for potential influences on the savings decisions, such
as financial literacy, age, education, household size, owning a business, havingmoney left after
buying all necessities, decision making power, and transaction costs in terms of the time and
money needed to travel to the center meeting. Table 3 confirms the non-parametric findings
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and shows that no interaction effect exists with the earnings amount (columns (3) and (4)). The
inclusion of control variables in columns (2) and (4) does not alter the results and thus confirms
successful randomization.17 The coefficients of the CiH treatment dummies are small and sta-
tistically indistinguishable from zero. When testing the two coefficients in columns (3) and (4)
for joint significance, the p-values of 0.79 and 0.99 clearly indicate that the null hypothesis of
no CiH effect cannot be rejected.
Table 3: Treatment Effect on Amount Saved
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES Amount Saved Amount Saved Amount Saved Amount Saved
CiH -3.533 -3.522 -1.370 -7.961
(13.25) (13.85) (17.26) (18.07)
[-28.49 - 22.11] [-28.87 - 22.69] [-34.30 - 31.42] [-41.00 - 25.59]
Endowment 500 64.56** 60.44**
(24.62) (22.98)
[17.28 - 111.1] [17.19 - 103.3]
CiH x 500 -4.215 8.068
(27.09) (27.24)
[-54.18 - 46.89] [-41.51 - 59.23]
Constant 167.9*** 58.24 134.8*** 39.56
(13.51) (71.96) (14.71) (71.34)
[142.6 - 194.1] [-76.78 - 205.3] [106.6 - 163.0] [-106.3 - 182.2]
p: CiH+CiH*500 = 0 0.791 0.996
Observations 300 300 300 300
Adj. R2 -0.003 0.035 0.053 0.097
Clustered SEs yes yes yes yes
Controls yes yes
Notes: OLS estimates with SE in parenthesis, wild cluster bootstrapped 95% CIs accounting for small number
of clusters (centers) in brackets. Controls: age, education, financial literacy, hh size, business owner, money left,
decision making power, distance to center, time to center, interviewer FE. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
The above discussed results show no effect of CiH on savings deposits. For this to be a
convincing and interesting result, two concerns need to be addressed. First, the results should
be sufficiently powered and second, the manipulation should have worked.
17The results are also robust to the inclusion of indicators for above median risk aversion, loss aversion, present
bias, and future bias. Due to potential problems of reverse causation (e.g. CiH could result in higher elicited loss
aversion), however, they are not included as controls in the reported regressions.
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3.3 Power
I conducted ex-ante power calculations to determine the sample size and now provide ex-
post power calculations for the minimal detectable effect sizes (MDE). Setting α = 0.05 and
1−β = 0.8 and using a two-sided t-test, I would be able to detect a difference of P 41, which is
equivalent to ten percent of the average earnings, and 0.33 standard deviations of the amount
saved.18 The confidence intervals in Table 3 andA.1 point to even smallerMDEs. Since their in-
terventions are similar, I use the MDE of 41 P and calculate standardized effect sizes for several
laboratory studies of the endowment effect (see Appendix E for details). Table E.1 provides
evidence that my power is sufficient to detect an effect smaller than what most other studies
find.
3.4 Manipulation check: Feeling richer with cash in hand
Does the physical presence of cash make any difference at all? While the treatment manipula-
tion is very similar to endowment effect variations that have been replicated in many studies,
I also present some evidence from my setting that the manipulation works. If the physical
presence of cash makes earnings and transactions more noticeable, CiH should lead to higher
perceived wealth prior to the savings decision. I use the following question from Part 1: ’How
much money will you personally be able to take home at the end of today?’ (money today). As
briefly pointed out before, questions from Part 1 (general household survey questions) might
be influenced by the CiH treatment. In particular, questions related to cash, such as income,
might be prone to influence from the CiH treatment. When being asked about money today,
individuals in CiHwere already holding on to cash, whereas individuals in CA only knew that
they would receive money later on. Note that at this point of the interview, individuals do
not know about the subsequent savings decision and can therefore not anticipate their savings
behavior and incorporate this in their report of money today.
Figure 3 presents the cumulative distribution function of reported money today and in-
dicates higher reports for CiH throughout most of the support of the distribution (means: CiH
P 707, CA P 606; Fligner-Policello test, p = 0.032; Kolmogorov-Smirnov test, p = 0.039).19
18In terms of the share saved, I would be able to detect a ten percentage point difference in shares saved between
CiH and CA (pooling the two earnings treatments), which represents 0.32 SD of the mean share saved. Calculated
with Stata’s power twomeans command.
19The pattern is the same for disaggregating the means on earnings level: CA300 = 581, CiH300 = 635, CA500 =
629, CiH500 = 778. However, the treatment difference is only statistically significant for P 500 (for P 300: Fligner-
Policello test, p = 0.782; Kolmogorov-Smirnov test, p = 0.844 and for P 500: Fligner-Policello test, p = 0.007;
Kolmogorov-Smirnov test, p = 0.001).
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Overall, reported amounts are higher on average than the earnings since, to obfuscate the pur-
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Figure 3: CDF of Money Today
It is important to verify that the difference in feeling richer is not driven by actual differ-
ences in wealth. Evidence for this comes from Figure 4, showing that the two CDFs of CiH and
CA are identical for an asset index that is constructed based on ten (non-cash) wealth-related
questions also asked in Part 1 (means: CiH 0.49, CA 0.48; Wilcoxon rank-sum test, p = 0.681;
Kolmogorov-Smirnov test, p = 1).20
The administrative data also provides ameasure for poverty, the Progress out of Poverty
Index (PPI).21 Based on ten questions regarding household wealth, the PPI score is comparable
to the asset index but cannot be influenced by my experiment, as it was measured prior to it.
The PPI score also shows that in terms of wealth, CiH and CA are the same (means: CiH 43.9,
CA 43.1; Wilcoxon rank-sum test, p = 0.51; Kolmogorov-Smirnov test, p = 0.88). I provide
20The questions range from the household’s access to running water and electricity to the possession of assets
such as TVs or mobile phones. All questions are binary and are aggregated into an equally weighted index, as
described in the pre-analysis plan and in Appendix J.
21The Progress out of Poverty Index (PPI) is a poverty measure ranging from 0− 100 that is managed by Inno-
vations for Poverty Action (IPA). The PPI score can be translated into a country-specific probability of living below
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Figure 4: CFD of Asset Index
additional manipulation checks in Appendix B that suggest a more general tendency to over-
report cash income in CiH.
Given successful randomization, the effect on money today is driven by the CiH manip-
ulation. Individuals with cash in hand feel richer, i.e. they expect to take home more money
than the control group. The widely used treatment manipulation was thus also effective in my
setting. However, the treatment did not lead to changes in behavior, which I will discuss in
Section 4.2.
3.5 Treatment effect heterogeneity and covariates
The null finding presented above might mask treatment effect heterogeneity. Based on the
previous literature, several groups that respond differently to CiH come to mind. For instance,
participants who use their savings account more might be less likely to be affected by the
psychological cost of making the deposit.
I use the administrative data to classify different types of savers, trying to capture
various dimensions of savings behavior. Participants might save large or small amounts.
Moreover, (ir)regular deposits capture the habit of saving in terms of frequency, whereas
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(un)equally-sized deposits get at savings goals in terms of amounts. For all three dimensions, I
have created binary indicators based on median splits of weekly savings deposits of all clients
in the three participating branches for the last nine months (up to the date on which the first
interviews were announced; see Appendix F for a detailed description). Large (weekly) de-
posits amount to more than P 33, regular depositors make deposits in at least 84 percent of the
weeks, and those with equally-sized deposits have a ratio of standard deviation to average de-
posit amounts of 1.03 or less. Table F.1 shows the resulting distribution of types in my sample,
for non-participants in sample centers and for all clients in non-sample centers. The types are
equally distributed across treatment groups, as shown in Table F.2. I use these types and the
deposit dummies (high, regular and equally-sized) to investigate treatment effect heterogene-
ity.
Other relevant dimensions might be narrow bracketing and loss aversion if the presence
of cash creates a stronger reference point in consumption, or cognitive abilities as those with
lower cognitive abilities are more likely to violate fungibility (Abeler and Marklein 2017). In
addition, a longer duration of the first part that determines the duration of holding the cash
in CiH might lead to lower savings due to the longer exposure to cash, similar to stronger
endowment effects with an increased duration of ownership (Strahilevitz and Loewenstein
1998).
Instead of arbitrarily and repeatedly subsetting the data, I use a model selection proce-
dure based on machine learning that automatically controls for multiple testing. In contrast
to manual data mining techniques, using an algorithm has the advantage of reducing the re-
searcher’s degrees of freedom, which have been shown to increase false positive rates (see e.g.
Simmons et al. 2011). Similar to all post-inferential estimations, this method describes effects
that are apparent in the data and can point to interesting questions to be considered for future
research. I used LASSOplus (Ratkovic and Tingley 2017), which estimates both treatment ef-
fect heterogeneity and important covariates and permits statistical inference. The algorithm
is a Bayesian method in which the effects are simultaneously estimated and selected. First,
each effect of a potential covariate and its interaction with CiH is consistently estimated and
then, following a thresholding rule estimated from the data, small effects are trimmed to zero.
Ratkovic and Tingley (2017) describe the method in detail and show in simulation studies that
it is conservative and has a low false discovery rate.
In addition to the type data, I include education as a proxy for cognitive abilities, du-
ration of the first part, preference data dummies for above loss and risk aversion as well as a
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dummy indicating present bias, indicators for narrow bracketing, an indicator for a high PPI
score, an indicator for being amongst the first five participants interviewed in a session (round
1) and, for consistency, the control variables from the regressions.22
Figure A.2 shows the density of selected effects. Consistent with the previous results,
the CiH dummy has not been selected as a significant determinant of the savings decision. The
algorithm did not detect a significant interaction effect either. This further strengthens the null
finding. Apart from assessing treatment heterogeneity, LASSOplus also determines significant
covariates of the savings decision. Five covariates, large deposits, high financial literacy, large
households, interviewer 2, and round 1, are significantly and positively related to the savings
decision.23 These covariates are in line with previously identified determinants of savings and
are a first indication that the controlled setting reflects actual savings decision making.
3.6 Ecological validity
Ecological validity assesses whether the study design is meaningful for the setting of interest.
To establish that the experimental savings decision is a relevant proxy for actual savings be-
havior, I compare the decision to actual savings. The decision is positively correlated with the
amount in the account (Spearman’s ρ = 0.138, p = 0.017), but not with the previous week’s de-
posit (Spearman’s ρ = 0.052, p = 0.37), which is likely due to the high volatility of the deposits.
Moreover, the decision is related to the total savings stock, which adds up all self-reported sav-
ings amounts from the survey (Spearman’s ρ = 0.173, p = 0.003). As also confirmed by the
LASSOplus estimation, my experimental setting thus reflects actual decision making and does
not appear to be overly complicated or artificial. More generally, I find that the participants’
answers to non-cash related questions in the interview are consistent with administrative data
and are thus not influenced by the experiment as such (see Appendix H).
3.7 Representativeness of the sample
Selection into the sample might occur on different levels. First, the participants might be dif-
ferent from those who were also present at the center meeting but did not participate. As ev-
eryone who was present volunteered to participate and the participants were randomly drawn
22Note that the estimation procedure is robust to including ’irrelevant’ variables, as they are shrunk to zero in
the selection process: For instance, only including the selected variables in the estimation and re-running it, results
in all variables being selected.
23Effect sizes (in P ): large deposits 23.27; high financial literacy 21.26; large households 33.52; interviewer 2
33.07; round 1 30.38. All selected covariates are balanced across treatments: Interviewer 2 and Round 1 by design
and the other variables by randomization (see also Table 2).
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from the volunteers, this should not be a problem. Second, as I sent announcement letters one
week in advance, microfinance clients not interested in participating in the study might have
decided not to attend the meeting during which the session took place. This is unlikely, as
all clients are required to attend the meetings and non-attendance negatively influences their
credit rating. In terms of savings balance, poverty, and age, I find that the non-participating








Savings balance ( P ) 782.7 -12.85 155.3 0.002 0.220
Loan amount ( P ) 21,551 -3,098*** -1,905 0.002 0.001
PPI score (0-100) 43.53 -0.0249 -2.195 0.002 0.505
Main income: Enterprise 0.831 0.0102 -0.0324 0.002 0.272
Electricity (y/n) 0.463 -0.0135 0.0828 0.006 0.159
Water (y/n) 0.159 0.0537 0.0567 0.001 0.133
Landline (y/n) 0.00676 -0.000652 0.00449 0.000 0.343
House size (0-2) 0.527 0.0468 0.0585 0.001 0.411
House strength (0-2) 0.591 0.0523 0.0907* 0.002 0.131
Membership (months) 49.03 -7.193** 3.567 0.005 0.018
Age 43.94 -1.211 0.570 0.003 0.011
N 300 819 3735
Notes: Mean of the sample and coefficients from OLS regressions (N= 4854) with dummies for non-
participants and non-sample centers as independent variables and clustered SE (not shown) at the center
level. The last column shows p-values of the F-test of joint significance of the non-participant dummies.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
However, it seems that non-participants are newer members and have smaller loans.24
Given that all other characteristics, most importantly savings and poverty, do not differ, I ar-
gue that selection into the experiment is not a concern. Lastly, the selection of centers based on
location and meeting times might have induced some bias. I therefore also compare my par-
ticipants with the remaining 3735 clients who are part of centers that are not in my sample, but
of the three study branches. Overall, I do not find sizable differences between my sample and
non-sample center clients (Table 4). Participants were thus successfully selected as a random
subset of the sample population with respect to observables.
24The MFI grants larger loans in later loan cycles (after the successful repayment of a smaller loan), therefore
membership duration and loan amount are highly correlated (Spearman’s ρ = 0.790, p < 0.001). The randomiza-
tion was carried out at the beginning of the meeting. One reason for this difference between my sample and the
non-participants could therefore be late arrivals at the center meeting if newer members are less disciplined and
thus have a higher probability of being late.
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4 Discussion
Why does cash in hand not alter the savings decisions? There are two possibilities: either cash
in hand consists of at least two effects and there exists another, counter-balancing effect that
increases savings to the same extent as the psychological cost of physically giving present cash
away (similar to the pain of paying, I will refer to this as ’pain of handing over cash’) decreases
savings. Or, CiH does not influence decisions at all. In the following, I will first explore the
former and then discuss issues related to the latter.
4.1 Cash in hand: Two effects?
Given that participants with CiH feel richer (as discussed in Section 3.4), CiH might not only
induce a savings-reducing pain of handing over cash effect but also a savings-increasing ’per-
ceived income’ effect (generally, higher income is associated with higher savings (e.g. Carroll
and Samwick 1998; Sandmo 1970)). Note that I cannot fully disentangle these two potential
effects as they always appear together. An ideal treatment would vary the presence of cash
(and thus pain of handing it over) without increasing the perceived income. This, however,
is impossible: Even if people are equally rich, this study has shown that holding cash results
in feeling richer. However, the experimental income variation allows me to provide some evi-
dence on the perceived income effect.25
As described in more detail in Appendix C, participants in CAwith larger experimental
income save more (absent any cash). The combination of participants feeling richer in CiH
and higher savings with higher experimental payments in CA, suggests that perceived income
effects could be at play in CiH.
Evaluating the magnitude of this effect is difficult, but can be approximated by a back-
of-the-envelope calculation. Participants in CiH report on average P 100 more money today.
As discussed above, this is only a rough proxy of the perceived income as it entails other
income and expenditures of the day. On average, participants save 42 percent of their earnings,
irrespective of the amount they receive. Assuming this savings rate also holds for perceived
income, feeling P 100 richer in CiH should lead to P 42 higher savings, absent pain of handing
over cash effects. As the obfuscated manipulation check question is noisy, I cannot establish a
difference between the perceived income effect of P 42 and the actual difference in savings of
25The following analysis is exploratory to better understand the null effect. It is not part of the pre-analysis plan.
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P -3.5 between CiH and CA.26 A difference would have been tentative evidence that both pain
of handing over cash and perceived income effects are at play and both effects are of a similar
size, given that all other factors that would reduce savings in CiH have been ruled out in the
experiment (as discussed in Appendix D).
Taken together, the evidence does not support the existence of two effects. First, the
analysis of treatment effect heterogeneity does not show any significant interaction of CiH
with covariates that are likely to vary with only one of the potential two counterbalancing
effects. Second, the back-of-the-envelope calculation does not provide convincing evidence
for the perceived income effect on savings. Third, Table A.2 shows parametrically that feeling
richer (money today) does not influence savings decisions, neither for CiH nor for CA. It thus
rather seems that there is no effect of CiH on savings deposits.
4.2 Cash in hand: No effect
Given that the previous literature established both pain of paying and endowment effects, it is
surprising that CiH does not influence behavior in this setting. In the following, I will ponder
potential reasons for the absence of an effect that could stem from differences in the design and
the setting as compared to the existing literature.
Design features
The payment amounts were chosen to make the savings decision meaningful. A very small
amount would result in participants not taking the decision seriously. While the payment
amounts might appear large in comparison to the median weekly savings deposit of P 33, they
are in the range of participants’ cash holdings during the center meetings as themedianweekly
loan repayment installment is P 333. Moreover, I do not detect treatment effect heterogeneity,
neither with respect to wealth nor with the savings amount in the account. CiH does not
influence the ratio of experimental savings to savings in the account either. While the amount
is not too large, it clearly renders the decision high-stakes. Implications are discussed together
with the additional incentive to save in the next paragraph.
The 20 percent match of amounts saved is a large incentive usually absent in laboratory
studies. It was implemented to calibrate the parameters such that savings amounts vary and
are not concentrated on the lower or upper end of the distribution and to reduce the potential
26To construct confidence intervals around P 42, I assume that the ratio of standard deviation to mean is the
same as in money today. This yields the 95 percent confidence interval [−17.47− 101.7] that includes -3.5.
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influence of present bias.27 While the calibration has been successful (reflected in the variety
of the shares of earnings that the participants save, see Figure 2 and A.1), the match constitutes
a large additional incentive to save and thus makes the experimental decision high-stakes.
High-stakes might lead to a better focus on the decision problem at hand and reduce behav-
ioral responses. The stake size is thus an important difference to the laboratory experiments.
If the cash in hand effect is comparatively small, it might only exist when impulsive, less im-
portant decisions are made (e.g. (over)reporting money today in the survey). For incentivized,
rather high-stakes decisions (the savings decision inmy experiment), individualsmight be able
to override the impulsive response and decide rationally. This would also explain why I do
not find a perceived income effect that would increase savings when respondents feel richer.
However, Anagol et al. (2018) show that endowment effects persist even in high-stakes field
environments such as the stock market. For cash in hand effects, similar evidence is lacking as
this is the first high-stakes study. Based on the income treatment variation, it does not appear
that the cash in hand effect is dependent on stake size, but it might be interesting to further
reduce the stake size (but keeping the decision meaningful) in future research.
The duration of cash holding has been adopted from the endowment effect literature.
While it is unclear whether endowment effects emerge instantaneously, a consensus exists that
15 minutes are sufficient to induce the effect in the laboratory (cf. Ericson and Fuster 2014).
The increase in perceived income further shows that the treatment manipulation was effective,
even though it provides a lower bound of how long individuals usually hold on to cash before
depositing it.28 In addition, the laboratory study most closely related in terms of design varies
cash in hand and a computerized display of earnings and finds an immediate effect of lower
charitable donations with cash in hand (Reinstein and Riener 2012).
The cash in hand treatment variation of this study keeps the representation of money
constant. All participants think about the deposit as a cash deposit and the only difference is
whether the cash is physically present at the time of decision making. This is an important dis-
tinction to the pain of paying studies in which cash payments are compared to card payments.
The design even keeps constant the denomination of the cash that participants decide about as
the exact denomination was shown publicly prior to the interviews.29 In this regard, the study
27Present bias is balanced across treatments and has not been selected by LASSOplus as a significant determi-
nant of the savings decision.
28Holding on to cash for several days would be an interesting extension, but this would entail other influences
such as temptation and social pressure to share the money.
29For spending cash, it has been shown that a single, larger denomination bill reduces spending as compared
to the same amount of money in smaller bills (Raghubir and Srivastava 2009). The treatment variation could have
resulted in different savings decisions if participants in CA thought about the cash in a different denomination than
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provides a clean test of cash in hand effects, as both the denomination and the representation
of money are kept constant across treatments and only the presence of cash is varied.
Finally, the design excludes all other explanations for low savings, such as transaction
costs, inertia in decision making, social constraints as well as lack of trust and regulatory bar-
riers (see also Appendix D). To summarize, in contrast to studies with comparable designs, the
stake size and the constant representation of money as cash and its denomination render this
study a clean, lower-bound test of cash in hand effects. Overall, the treatment manipulation
has been effective and the fact that the experimental savings are related to pre-experimental
savings in the account (as discussed in Section 3.6) shows that the experiment reflects real-life
savings behavior.
Setting
The setting of this study differs from laboratory experiments in several aspects: this study ex-
amines the behavior of participants who are exposed to institutional incentives to save, might
have an intrinsic motivation to put money aside, are experienced with cash transactions and
might be prone to using simple heuristics.
The savings account only bears interest when a minimum balance of P 500 is main-
tained for a year. This might create an additional incentive to save for the 147 participants (73
in CiH and 74 in CA) below this threshold. This is not a concern, since participants above the
threshold save rather more (Wilcoxon rank-sum test, p = 0.062) and the amount necessary to
reach the threshold is not correlated with the savings decision of those who have fewer than
P 500 in their savings account (Spearman’s ρ = −0.062, p = 0.456).
For motivated savers, CiH could increase the salience of savings rather than consump-
tion, and thus lead to larger savings. Approximating motivation (and experience) with the
different types of savers, I do not find treatment effect heterogeneity that would support this.
Given that all participants have a savings account, 81 percent state that they are currently sav-
ing, the large incentive to save (20% match) and savings balances of on average P 790 (that
makes it easy to meet the criteria for receiving the match) one would assume high motivation
to save. It thus is rather surprising that only 15 percent save their entire earnings. Overall,
participants do not seem to be overly motivated to save.
the ones in CiH who actually hold the bills in their hands. The equality of distributions of the share and amount
saved in CiH and CA (as depicted in Figures A.1 and 2) show that this is not a concern.
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Relying on a poor sample and knowing that poverty might impede cognitive function
(Mani et al. 2013), participants might not deliberate about the decision, but act based on a
simple heuristic when deciding. While the distribution of the amounts that participants save
indicate that focal points are important (Figure 2), the shares saved are statistically different
from a 50:50 heuristic (t-test, p = 0.002 for CA and p < 0.001 for CiH).
Lastly, all participants are experienced with cash transactions. While some studies have
found that endowment effects disappear for experienced participants (e.g. Engelmann and
Hollard 2010; List 2011), recent evidence from the field documents endowment effects that
persist even for experienced traders (Anagol et al. 2018).30 In addition, literature on cash in
hand and pain of paying has documented these effects in samples that are also experienced
in cash transactions. Therefore, experience is unlikely to be the driving force behind the null
result.
All in all, the field setting provides an interesting but different sample in comparison
to existing studies. More research is needed to tease out which aspects of the design and the
setting discussed above actually contributed to the absence of a cash in hand effect or whether
cash in hand effects generally do not exit in savings decisions. In particular the role of stakes,
denomination and representation appear to be worth further investigation.
5 Conclusion
This study tests cash in hand effects in the domain of savings. In a cash-dominated setting,
holding on to cash does not reduce savings deposits due to the physical cash transaction. The
manipulation check and the correlation of experimental with real-world behavior establish
internal and ecological validity of the study.
Given sufficient power to detect economically relevant effect sizes for the cash in hand
effect, this null effect is an interesting result that complements the literature in several aspects.
First, the findings are of interest for behavioral economics as they suggest that cash in hand
effects found in the laboratory are not generalizable to all field settings. In a realistic, high-
stakes decision environment, the physical deposit of cash does not distort decision making.
30Whether experience fully eliminates the endowment effect is still an open question. Engelmann and Hollard
(2010), Giné and Goldberg (2018), and List (2003, 2011) provide evidence that experience with a similar transaction
eliminates the endowment effect. However, Harbaugh et al. (2001) show that general market experience does not
reduce reluctance to exchange goods in the laboratory and Anagol et al. (2018) demonstrate that while trading
experience reduces the endowment effect for stocks (by 17 percentage points as compared to non-experienced
traders), they still document a sizable effect: a 60% higher likelihood of holding the stock for experienced traders.
26
Second, the null effect is good news for development economics as it suggests no additional
bias that reduces savings deposits on top of previously documented mechanisms. Lastly, for
consumer research, the results of this study imply that the ’pain of paying’ is not driven by
the mere physical presence of cash. It rather seems that the representation of money and its
denomination – both held constant in this study – contribute to the pain of paying.
Due to its prevalence, cash merits a better understanding of how it influences decisions.
The finding that participants who hold on to cash feel richer should be replicated and inves-
tigated further as this might have important implications for experimental design. Moreover,
the present design could be easily modified to test e.g. whether the presence of cash increases
temptation or whether it facilitates planning.
In addition to studying cash itself, future research could study how cash as compared
to electronic payments influences decision making. Currently, little empirical evidence exists
and the welfare benefits appear to be mixed. For example, on the one hand (micro) digital
finance appears to have many advantages such as changing financial behaviors and lifting
about two percent of the population out of poverty in Kenya (Suri and Jack 2016), facilitating
risk sharing (Jack and Suri 2014) or helping smooth income shocks (Riley 2018). On the other
hand, other evidence suggests that both repayment rates for digital credit in Kenya and Tanza-
nia (Kaffenberger et al. 2018) and savings rates in a mobile banking setting in the Philippines
(Harigaya 2017) are lower than their cash counterparts.
An enhanced understanding of the behavioral benefits and costs of cash and other
means of transactions will help design better policies, not only in developing countries. This
study contributes to building this knowledge base, providing a clean test of cash effects in a
relevant setting with an easy-to-adopt design for laboratory and field settings.
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Figure A.1: Distribution of Shares Saved
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Table A.1: Treatment Effect on Savings Decision
VARIABLES Share Saved
(1) (2) (3) (4)
CiH -0.00796 -0.00869 -0.00457 -0.0206
(0.0354) (0.0358) (0.0575) (0.0572)
[-0.0762 - 0.0615] [ -0.0747 - 0.0588] [-0.113 - 0.105] [-0.125 - 0.086]
Endowment 500 -0.0506 -0.0643
(0.0630) (0.0589)
[-0.177 - 0.0680] [-0.177 - 0.0423]
CiH500 -0.00660 0.0236
(0.0711) (0.0716)
[-0.141 - 0.129] [-0.110 - 0.156]
Constant 0.423*** 0.138 0.449*** 0.160
(0.0317) (0.157) (0.0490) (0.164)
[0.364 - 0.483] [-0.179 - 0.469 ] [ 0.359 - 0.542 ] [-0.172 - 0.508]
p: CiH+CiH500 = 0 0.791 0.945
Observations 300 300 300 300
Adj. R2 0.000 0.083 0.008 0.090
Clustered SEs yes yes yes yes
Controls yes yes
Notes: OLS estimates, robust SE clustered on session level in parentheses, wild cluster bootstrapped 95%
CIs accounting for small number of clusters (centers) in brackets; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; Controls:
age, education, financial literacy, household size, business owner, money left, decision making power, time to
center, travel cost to center, interviewer FE.
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Figure A.2: Density of Selected Effects on Amount Saved
Notes: LASSOplus using linear estimation and allowing for interactions with the CiH dummy. Selected
variables: high financial literacy, interviewer 2, large deposits and large households and first round. No
significant interaction effects. Binary indicators (for above median value where applicable) included:
Age, education, financial literacy, household size, business owner, money left, decision making power,
time to center, travel cost to center, duration of part 1, PPI score, narrow bracketing in both questions,
narrow bracketing in one question, risk aversion, loss aversion, present bias, future bias, high savings
balance, large deposit, regular deposit, equally-sized deposits, trust in banks, trust in partner organiza-
tion, as well as dummies for saver type, interviewer and interview round within center.
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Table A.2: Effect of Money Today
Panel A: Amount Saved
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
VARIABLES All CiH CA All CiH CA
Money Today (ln) 9.120 10.85 8.356 10.06 13.67 17.02
(8.614) (11.48) (12.33) (9.857) (15.22) (13.34)
[-6.833 -25.19] [-10.69 - 33.05] [-16.05 - 31.42] [ -8.311 - 28.25] [-14.70 - 41.78] [-7.773 - 40.74]
Constant 112.8** 99.31 120.3 -15.31 66.47 -207.6
(52.12) (68.87) (75.59) (94.02) (130.9) (129.6)
[15.25 -210.9] [-31.87 - 229.6] [-21.58 - 267.9] [-166.2 - 175.8] [-188.7 - 307.8] [-348.8 - 65.17]
Observations 266 136 130 266 136 130
R2 0.006 0.008 0.005 0.091 0.073 0.189
Panel B: Share Saved
Money Today (ln) 0.0164 0.0144 0.0186 0.0150 0.0104 0.0395
(0.0179) (0.0268) (0.0247) (0.0204) (0.0378) (0.0286)
[-0.0174 - 0.0503] [-0.0362 - 0.0653] [-0.0287 - 0.0666] [-0.0235 - 0.0528] [-0.0581 - 0.0789] [-0.0126 - 0.0919]
Constant 0.326*** 0.336** 0.315* -0.00916 0.265 -0.487*
(0.113) (0.163) (0.157) (0.179) (0.316) (0.274)
[-0.0174 - 0.0503] [0.0218 - 0.643] [0.0132 - 0.613] [-0.334 - 0.386] [-0.385 - 0.826] [-0.785 - 0.143]
Observations 266 136 130 266 136 130
R2 0.003 0.002 0.005 0.088 0.079 0.163
Clustered SEs yes yes yes yes yes yes
Controls yes yes yes
Notes: OLS estimates, robust SE clustered on session level in parenthesis, wild cluster bootstrapped 95% CIs accounting for small number of clusters
(centers) in brackets. Controls: age, education, financial literacy, household size, business owner, money left, decision making power, time to center, travel
cost to center, interviewer FE. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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B Additional evidence for feeling richer with CiH
The manipulation check presented in the main analysis is further supported by Table B.1 that
shows the same effects plotted in Figure 3 in a regression analysis of the mean effects.31
The coefficient on the treatment dummy CiH in Column (1) shows that treated individ-
uals report about 28 percent higher money today than in CA. This effect is robust to the inclu-
sion of a set control variables in Column (2). Column (3) shows that in terms of assets, both
groups are the same. Since this feeling richer might also be visible in other income questions,
Columns (2) and (3) of Table B.2 provide suggestive evidence that CiH influences reporting
behavior more generally: For cash income, a variable that pools all income that respondents
report to receive in cash, the CiH dummy indicates somewhat higher reports (p=0.13), whereas
in terms of non-cash income, participants appear to be the same (p=0.81).32
Table B.1: Parametric Evidence For Feeling Richer with Cash in Hand
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES Money Today (ln) Money Today (ln) Assets Assets
CiH 0.279** 0.261** 0.00769 0.00504
(0.128) (0.0999) (0.0143) (0.0128)
[0.0413 - 0.526] [0.0772 - 0.447] [-0.0190 - .0346] [-0.0187 - 0.0285]
Constant 5.890*** 5.786*** 0.482*** 0.246**
(0.105) (0.440) (0.0160) (0.0890)
[5.690 - 6.089] [3.947 - 5.569] [0.451 - 0.512] [0.0476 - 0.369]
Observations 266 266 300 300
Adj. R2 0.014 0.238 -0.003 0.088
Clustered SEs yes yes yes yes
Controls yes yes
Notes: "Money Today" is the answer to the question: "Howmuch money do you think you will take home at the
end of the day?" 34 participants (14 in CiH and 20 in CA) stated that they do not know. OLS estimates, robust
SE clustered on center level in parentheses, wild cluster bootstrapped 95% CIs accounting for small number of
clusters (centers) in brackets. Controls: age, education, financial literacy, household size, business owner, money
left, decision making power, time to center, travel cost to center, interviewer FE. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
31For regressions, I use log of money today as the variable is highly skewed.
32Given the relevance of cash, I ask for each income source how this income is received (in cash, via check/
deposit or wire transfer). All these questions are asked in Part 1. For more details, see also Appendix J.
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Table B.2: Feeling Richer: Other Income Measures
(1) (2) (3)
VARIABLES Cash Income (ln) Non-Cash Income (ln) PPI Score
CiH 0.314 0.0853 0.367
(0.201) (0.351) (1.861)
[-0.0529-0.693] [-0.5778-0.740] [-3.141-3.920]
Constant 7.521*** 0.251 21.19**
(1.506) (1.925) (9.623)
[5.694-10.90] [-4.521-2.346] [5.675-39.79]
Observations 300 300 296
Adj. R2 0.205 0.111 0.121
Clustered SEs yes yes yes
Controls yes yes yes
Notes: "Cash Income" ("Non-Cash Income’") comprises all income that the respondent re-
ports to receive in cash (other means of payment). OLS estimates, robust SE clustered on
center level in parentheses, wild cluster bootstrapped 95% CIs accounting for small num-
ber of clusters (centers) in brackets. Controls: age, education, financial literacy, household
size, business owner, money left, decision making power, time to center, travel cost to center,
interviewer FE. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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C The income effect: Saving more with higher income
Exogenously varying income in the second treatment dimension provides direct evidence for
the income effect. Participants with CiHmight be influenced by both the perceived income and
the pain of handing over cash effects. Therefore I focus on the 150 participants inCA that do not
hold cash when making the savings decisions. I replicate the previously documented income
effect as shown in Figure C.1: receiving P 200 more results in P 65 higher savings (CA only,
























Figure C.1: Mean Amount Saved in CA by Earnings Amount
not save anything (12 percent (9 percent) in P 300 ( P 500)) provides evidence against reference-
dependence: if the participants had established a reference point around a consumption level
of P 300 prior to the savings decision, a larger fraction of participants in P 300 would not have
saved anything.34 This result clearly shows that the income effect is generally present in this
environment.
33The results do not change when participants in CiH are included. In terms of relative savings, participants
save the same in the P 300 and P 500 treatments (mean shares saved in CA 0.449 and 0.399, Fligner-Policello test,
p = 0.670). However, income effects have been established for absolute amounts.
34I cannot disentangle whether participants did not establish a reference point or whether the incentive to save
overruled its effects. However, the match appeared more important for a clean test of cash in hand effects (absent
time preferences), so that I leave a more rigorous test of reference-dependent savings and its potential interactions
with the incentives for saving for future research.
D Factors reducing savings
Based on the factors contributing to undersavings reviewed by Karlan et al. (2014), I discuss
which other effects, in addition to cash in hand, might lead to a reduction in savings in my
experiment in general and in the CiH treatment in particular.
Transaction costs Transaction costs have been shown to be an important factor inhibiting
savings (e.g. Dupas and Robinson 2013; Prina 2015). In my setting, marginal transaction costs
for saving are zero since individuals are required to take part in the center meeting for their
loan repayment and there are no account opening or withdrawal fees. In addition, travel time
to themeeting is low (mean=6minutes, SD=6) and costs are negligible (mean=P 0.77, SD=3.88).
Both variables are balanced across treatments (see Table 2) and CiH does not alter transaction
costs beyond the psychological costs of making the physical transaction. Transaction costs thus
do not play a role in the experimental savings decision.
Lack of trust and regulatory barriers Since my sample consists of clients of one MFI, regula-
tory barriers to savings are constant. Mistrust in banks in general is quite high, but 93 percent
consider savings with theMFI safe. Both trust variables are balanced across treatments (see Ta-
ble 2). Differential trust in the banking system therefore should not lead to savings differences
across treatments in my setting.
However, since, in CiH, earnings have already been handed over, the treatment might
increase the credibility of and thus the trust in the interviewer. It is unclear how lower trust
in receiving the money in CA would affect savings. Possibly, it would increase the variance
in the savings. The standard deviations of both savings measures, however, are similar in
CiH and CA (0.31 vs 0.30 for share of earnings saved and 125 vs 126 for amount saved). In
addition, the fact that participants in CA react to the variation in experimental payments by
saving more with higher income, indicated that all participants trust in receiving the cash.
Moreover, the procedures have been designed to foster credibility and trust: An announcement
letter was sent a week in advance, the sessions took place as announced, and the cash to be
earned was publicly displayed in front of all the clients and the loan officer before starting with
the interviews. In addition, the receipts and vouchers were shown during the explanations and
handed out after the decisions were made. It is thus unlikely that trust differentially affected
the savings decisions.
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Information and knowledge gaps As shown by the LASSOplus estimation, high financial
literacy is generally related to higher savings, but the former does not appear to interact with
CiH. Both financial literacy and education are balanced across treatments (see Table 2).35 Since
CiH does not alter information and all the questions regarding savings were only asked after
the decision to save, information and knowledge gaps did not influence savings differently
across treatments.
Social constraints Especially in developing countries, where informal risk-sharing plays an
important role, both intra- and inter-household claims can result in substantial constraints on
savings. In my sample, both claims from family members (in particular, the husband) and
friends are balanced across treatments (see Table 2). The same holds true for decision making
power within the household, the levels of which are comparable to the decision making power
of females in a different study in the Philippines (Ashraf et al. 2010).36 Since all transactions in
this MFI are public, depositing savings can also lead to requests from other clients to help out
with loan repayments. While this is an important factor and 66 percent would like to have a
private account, this is also balanced across treatments. Moreover, participation in the study
as well as earnings are common knowledge in centers, so that neither saving nor keeping the
money provides an opportunity to hide money. Lastly, four weeks after the savings decision,
only five percent reported having given (some of) their non-saved experimental earnings to
relatives (see Table G.1). Social constraints thus do not lead to differential savings in the CiH
treatment.
Behavioral biases The literature has highlighted several behavioral biases associated with
low savings, the most prominent one being present bias (Karlan et al. 2014). I argue that time
preferences and in particular temptation should not differentially affect the experimental sav-
ings decision. Although holding cash could increase temptation, spending the cash during the
experiment was not possible and the later use of the cash was not made salient. To further re-
duce the potential influence of present bias, savings during the experiment were incentivized,
offering a lucrative interest rate of 20 percent for the first month. Moreover, present bias is bal-
anced across treatments and has not been selected by LASSOplus as a significant determinant
35While CA500 appears to be positively related to financial literacy when considering α = 0.1, its coefficient
is not statistically different from that of CiH300 or CiH500. This is reflected in the insignificant F -test. Adjusting
significance levels for multiple testing would render the coefficient insignificant.
36While CiH500 appears to be a negatively related to decision making power when considering α=0.1, its coef-
ficient is not statistically different from CA500. Considering the coefficients of the two CiH treatments jointly, they
become statistically indistinguishable from zero.
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of the savings decision. The secondmost researched bias in the savings literature is inattention,
both to savings and emergencies that could require savings. I elicited attention to household
finances and show that both attention to short run (day-to-day) and medium run finances are
balanced (see Table 2). Attention to decision making more generally is addressed by incenti-
vation, making the savings decision high-stake (median experimental deposit: P 100; median
real life deposit: P 30).37 The match, high stakes and successful randomization thus rule out
that other biases led to differentially lower savings.
Interviewer demand effects Especially in a culture in which keeping face is important, par-
ticipants might want to save just to please the interviewer. Although the instructions make it
clear that any amount from zero up to the full earnings amount can be saved, the match could
be interpreted as a signal that the interviewer or the experimenter values savings. However,
it is unclear whether and how interviewer demand would interact with CiH. One could imag-
ine the demand effects to be stronger in CiH, e.g. due to positive reciprocity. This would lead
to larger savings in CiH. Alternatively, actively stating ’I don’t want to save anything’ might
be harder than just not handing over any money, which would reduce savings in CiH. Fur-
ther, participants in CAmight overstate their true desire for savings to please the experimenter
and to make sure they will receive their earnings. Overall, it is unlikely that demand effects
affect savings differently in CiH than in CA. Moreover, as discussed in Section 3.6, the exper-
imental decision is related to pre-experimental savings behavior. The correlation coefficients
for experimental savings and the pre-experimental savings balance in CiH (ρ = 0.1573) and
CA (ρ = 0.1190) are not statistically significantly different from each other, further reducing
concerns of differential experimenter demand. Lastly, differential demand effects across inter-
viewers are ruled out by balancing CiH and CAwithin each interviewer.
The combination of sample balance on all relevant observables and design features that pre-
vent the differential influence of trust and temptation on the savings decision allows me to
rule out any reduction in savings in the CiH treatment other than the pain of handing over
cash effect of cash in hand.
37This might lead to an estimation of the lower bound for the cash in hand effect. For instance, if the bias is
comparatively small it might only exist when impulsive, less important decisions are made (e.g. (over)reporting
money today in the survey). For incentivized, rather high-stakes decisions (the savings decision in my experiment),
individuals might be able to override this bias.
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E Comparison of effect sizes
To put the magnitude of my minimal detectable effect (MDE) sizes into perspective, I compare













Taking the MDE of 41 P for mean amounts saved into account, I set the effect size in the treat-
ment group to 127 P and assume that the SD would be the same as the observed one. In Ta-
ble E.1, I include all endowment effect studies (excluding surveys) cited in this paper that
provide the necessary information to calculate Cohen’s d.
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Table E.1: Comparison of Effect Sizes in Endowment Effect Experiments
Control (WTP) Treatment (WTA)
Comparison Mean SD N Mean SD N Cohen’s d
Svirsky (2014) Money holding in baseline and money 6.56 2.17 21 5.43 2.53 18 -0.48
Money holding in money and chocolate 4.55 3.07 40 5.43 2.53 18 0.31
Bateman et al. (2005) WTA/WTP chocolate with money 4.66 2.82 40 9.95 4.58 40 1.43**
WTP and equivalent gain, chocolate with money 4.66 2.82 40 8.17 5.05 40 0.89**
Morewedge et al. (2009) Owner-buyers vs. nonowner-pair buyers 2.22 1.7 22 4.52 2.8 22 1.02**
Plott and Zeiler (2005) Replication of Kahneman et al. (1990) 1.74 1.46 29 4.72 2.17 29 1.64***
Pooled data fromWTA/WTP mugs 6.62 4.2 36 5.56 3.58 38 -0.27
Isoni et al. (2011) Replication Plott and Zeiler (2005) (Panel B) 3.70 1.53 33 2.75 1.76 33 -0.58
WTA/WTP for large stakes lottery (Panel C) 4.86 1.59 36 4.81 1.48 36 -0.032***
Bushong et al. (2010) Bid in picture vs. real 0.71 0.53 17 1.13 0.61 20 0.74***
Strahilevitz and Loewenstein (1998) Those with always mug to those who receive it later 4.32 0.41 37 5.26 0.39 48 2.35*
Those with always mug to those who had it 3.36 0.27 34 5.26 0.39 48 5.76
This study Amount saved in CiH vs. CA 168 126 150 127 125 150 -0.33
Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 denote significance of the treatment difference as tested in the paper.
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F Classification of saver types
Types of savers are classified along three dimensions that reflect different aspects of savings
behavior as pre-specified: First, making regular or irregular deposits, depositing large or small
amounts and depositing equally-sized or variable amounts. Data come from all centers of the
three study branches and comprises weekly deposits (and withdrawals) of savings, starting
from July 2016 up to and including the week in which the first announcement letters were sent
(the last day included is February 17, 2017).38 This leaves me with 4749 clients (300 sample
clients, 676 clients from the same centers, but not participating and 3773 clients from different
centers).39
Regular deposits averages the number of positive net deposits (deposits - withdrawals)
within each client and compares this average to the median value of all clients’ averages. The
dummy variable regular deposits equals one if a given client’s average is the same or above
the median value of making positive deposits in 84.4 percent of weeks.
Large deposits indicates above median deposit sizes ( P 33.13). In this calculation, I only
include positive net deposits to avoid the influence of weeks in which no deposit was made or
moneywaswithdrawn, as no (or negative) deposit is already accounted for in regular deposits.
Equally-sized deposits indicates a below median value of the deposit variance to average
deposit ratio (1.03).40 The variance is standardized with the average deposit to take care of the
size of deposits, which is already measured in large deposits.
38Excluding all later sessions prevents any spill-over effects from the experiment on subsequent savings behav-
ior. In addition, using deposits rather than the savings stock accounts better for behavior than the stock as the latter
is highly correlated with membership length.
39Some clients joint later than July 2016, for them, fewer weekly observations are available. To account for this,
I use within-client averages before computing median values.
40An alternative measure would be to count the number of weeks in which the same amount was deposited as
in the previous week.
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Table F.1: Saver Types
% in Sample % in same Center % in same Branches
N=300 N=676 N=3773
Irregular-small-variable 9.67 10.64 7.05
Irregular-small-equal 13.00 10.78 12.25
Irregular-large-variable 11.00 20.24 20.92
Irregular-large-equal 12.67 9.31 7.32
Regular-small-variable 12.00 12.11 11.77
Regular-small-equal 12.00 13.00 18.37
Regular-large-variable 12.67 9.765 11.93
Regular-large-equal 17.00 14.18 10.39
Notes: Regular vs. irregular deposits; small vs. large deposits; equally-sized vs.
variable deposits (all based on median sample splits). "Sample" comprises all in-
terviewees, "in same Center" are non-participants in sample centers and "in same
Branches" are non-sample centers in the study branches.
Table F.2: Balance of Saver Types in Experimental Sample
CA300 CiH300 CA500 CiH500 R
2 F-test
Saver Types
Regular deposit 0.452 0.110* 0.119 -0.123 0.009 0.331
Large deposit 0.479 0.0411 0.0660 -0.00213 0.006 0.606
Equally sized deposits 0.589 -0.0685 -0.0566 0.0815 0.003 0.833
Irregular-small-variable 0.178 -0.0959** -0.113 0.0959* 0.025 0.133
Irregular-small-equal 0.178 -0.0548 -0.0742 0.0678 0.007 0.430
Irregular-large-variable 0.0548 0.0822 0.0621 -0.0692 0.011 0.313
Irregular-large-equal 0.137 -0.0411 0.00587 0.0281 0.003 0.795
Regular-small-variable 0.0822 0.0274 0.0737 -0.0534 0.007 0.657
Regular-small-equal 0.0822 0.0822 0.0477 -0.108 0.009 0.408
Regular-large-variable 0.0959 0.0548 0.0340 -0.0548 0.003 0.777
Regular-large-equal 0.192 -0.0548 -0.0359 0.0938 0.004 0.631
Notes: Mean of the CA300 group and coefficients from OLS regressions with treat-
ment dummies as independent variables and clustered SE (not shown) at the center
level. The last column shows p-values of the F-test of joint significance of the treat-
ment dummies. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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G Match and follow-up
Four weeks after the respective session, each center was visited again to deposit the match for
eligible participants. Moreover, participants were briefly surveyed regarding i) whether they
wish that they had saved a different amount and ii) what they did with their experimental
earnings if they did not save the full amount.
Table G.1: Four weeks after the savings decision
Cash Announced Cash in Hand
Match
Received match (0/1) 0.787 (0.411) 0.826 (0.380)
Wish saved more (0/1) 0.410 (0.494) 0.407 (0.493)
Wish saved less (0/1) 0.566 (0.498) 0.558 (0.499)
Would now save ( P ) 128.2 ( 177.0) 134.3 (178.5)





Other savings 13 10
Lending 2 2
Relatives 9 4
Payoff debt 3 7
Bills 6 13
Other 3 2
n/a (saved everything) 22 24
Notes: Upper panel: means of raw data, SD in parentheses.
Lower panel: number of participants stating the respective rea-
son as the main use of their experimental earnings (open ended
question). N=244 (126 CA and 118 CiH).
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H Reliability of survey responses
The reliability of participants’ responses during the interview ("interview data") can be eval-
uated based on administrative data that cover savings, characteristics of the person (e.g. age)
and the house (e.g. connected to running water). While reports of age in the administrative
and the interview data should be highly correlated, the correlation might be weaker for sav-
ings reports due to e.g. inattention or social concerns when reporting. Indeed, as Table H.1
shows, age is nearly perfectly correlated in self-reported and administrative data. Reports of
savings in the account (interview data) are also positively correlated with actual savings (ad-
ministrative data). Being composed of ten questions regarding householdwealth, the PPI score
from the administrative data is comparable to the asset index in the interview data and the two
are positively correlated. Comparing single questions that are part of both indices, however, I
find significantly higher asset possessions in the interview data (electricity, running water and
landline phones).41 Overall, it seems that participants respond consistently regarding the most
important aspects of this study.
Table H.1: Correlation of Self-Reported and Administrative Data
Self-reported Data Administrative Data Correlation
Savings balance 767.4 (1494) 790.3 (1230) 0.734***
Total savings/savings balance ( P ) 6108.7 (11175) 790.3 (1230) 0.454***
Age 43.57 (12.35) 43.94 (12.31) 0.979***
Assets/PPI score 0.486 (0.166) 43.53 (19.65) 0.370***
Electricity 0.95 (0.218) 0.468 (0.499) 0.047
Landline 0.056 (0.232) 0.00676 (0.082) -0.020
Water 0.69 (0.463) 0.158 (0.366) 0.072
Notes: Means of raw data, SD in parentheses and Spearman’s ρ. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
41This could either be due to at least two reasons. First, living conditions might have improved since that the
administrative data was last collected. Second, participants might underreport their assets vis-à-vis the MFI in
order to appear "needy". In theory, the organization committed to only serving the very poor as assessed by a
progression out of poverty index. However, from discussions with the management, it appears that this rule is not








LMU · Geschwister-Scholl-Platz 1 · 80539 Munich · Germany   
 
    
   Munich, February 1, 2017 
           
 
 
Dear ASHI member, 
 
You are cordially invited to take part in a survey on household finances.  
 
We are a team of independent researchers from the University of Munich in Germany and 
we would like to learn more about your needs and the way you use microfinance products. 
As a member of ASHI, you can provide us with valuable information that might help improve 
existing microfinance products. 
 
We would like to interview several members of ASHI individually. The involvement in the 
interview will require about 30 minutes and interviews will be in Tagalog. Interview 
participants will receive at least 300 pesos as a token of appreciation and every member of 
the center has the same chance to participate in an interview. 
 
The interviews will take place during the center meeting on [DATE] and all answers will be 
treated confidentially, i.e. we will not share your answers with ASHI. All interviews will be 
conducted in private by the team of independent researchers. 
 
We would be very happy if many of you were interested in taking part in the survey and 
came to the center meeting on that day. 
 








Researcher at the University of Munich, Germany 
 
 
Lisa Spantig, M.Sc. 
 














    
     
I Instructions
I.1 Announcement Letter
The announcement letter was distributed via the loan officer one week before the session. The
loan officer announced the visit and each member received her individual copy.
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I.2 Interview Questionnaire
The survey was implemented in zTree (Fischbacher 2007) and run on tablets. The formatted
questionnaire thus only serves to display all questions in this document. Before each interview,
I set the parameter of the zTree program such that all instructions would be shown according
to the pre-determined treatment allocation. This enabled all surveyors to interview in both
CiH and CA treatments without confusion, as the program would give detailed instructions
on what to do and when.
49
Page 1 of 15 
 
 
Ora l Informe d Conse nt (surve y) 
My na me  is _______ a nd  I wo rk with a  re se a rc h te a m fro m the  Unive rsity o f Munic h in Ge rma ny. 
The  Unive rsity o f Munic h is a  p ub lic  unive rsity a nd  o ne  o f the  le a d ing  re se a rc h unive rsitie s in 
Euro p e .  
1. Purpose : We  a re  c o nd uc ting  a  re se a rc h stud y to  le a rn a b o ut fina nc ia l p ro d uc ts in 
La g una  p ro vinc e , Philipp ine s. The  p urp o se  o f this stud y is to  b e tte r und e rsta nd  ho w 
p e o p le  ma na g e  the ir ho use ho ld  fina nc e s a nd  wha t c o uld  he lp  the m to  ma ke  
ma na g ing  ho use ho ld  fina nc e s e a sie r. We  will p ut the  c o lle c te d  info rma tio n yo u g ive  us 
to  g o o d  use  fo r imp ro ving  e xisting  mic ro fina nc e  pro d uc ts a s b e st a s p o ssib le . 
2. Invita tion a nd Proc e dure s: I’ d  like  to  a sk yo u so me  q ue stio ns a b o ut yo ur fina nc ia l 
e xp e rie nc e s. We  a ntic ipa te  tha t yo ur invo lve me nt will re q uire  a b o ut 30 mins. 
3. Compe nsa tion: As a  sma ll to ke n o f a p p re c ia tio n, yo u will re c e ive  300/ 500 p e so s.  
4. Confide ntia lity: All o f yo ur re sp o nse s will b e  ke p t c o nfid e ntia l. Only the  unive rsity 
re se a rc he rs invo lve d  in this stud y a nd  tho se  re sp o nsib le  fo r re se a rc h o ve rsig ht will ha ve  
a c c e ss to  a ll the  info rma tio n yo u p ro vid e .  
5. Volunta ry Pa rtic ipa tion: Pa rtic ip a tio n in this stud y is c o mp le te ly vo lunta ry. Yo u a re  fre e  to  
d e c line  to  p a rtic ip a te , to  e nd  p a rtic ip a tio n a t a ny time  fo r a ny re a so n, o r to  re fuse  to  
a nswe r a ny ind ivid ua l q ue stio n witho ut p e na lty o r lo ss o f c o mp e nsa tio n. We  will still g ive  
yo u the  300/ 500 p e so s e ve n if yo u d o n’ t wa nt to  a nswe r so me  q ue stio ns. Ho we ve r, if yo u 
d e c id e  to  te rmina te  the  inte rvie w e a rly, we  mig ht no t b e  a b le  to  g ive  yo u the  mo ne y. 
6. Conta c t: If yo u ha ve  a ny q ue stio ns o r c o nc e rns a b o ut this stud y, yo u ma y c o nta c t the  
re se a rc he r Lisa  Sp a ntig  09952305531. 
7. Ag re e me nt to  Pa rtic ipa te : By a g re e ing  to  p a rtic ip a te , yo u a g re e  tha t a ll info rma tio n 
whic h yo u vo lunta rily sha re  ma y b e  use d  p ure ly fo r re se a rc h p urp o se s b y the  re se a rc h 
te a m o r o the r re se a rc he rs. This inc lud e s fina nc ia l info rma tio n yo u p ro vid e  a nd  
info rma tio n tha t ASHI sha re s with us. All d a ta  is c o nfid e ntia l a nd  no ne  o f the  info rma tio n 
yo u p ro vid e  will b e  use d  in c o nne c tio n with yo ur na me . Yo ur d e c isio n to  p a rtic ip a te  
d o e s no t a ffe c t yo ur ASHI me mb e rship  in a ny wa y, b e c a use  we  d o  no t wo rk fo r ASHI. We  
a re  ind e p e nd e nt re se a rc he rs. 
 
Are  yo u willing  to  p a rtic ipa te ?  ____YES 
 ____NO 
 
IF NO : Yo u d e c id e d  no t to  p a rtic ip a te . If yo u d e c id e  to  c o nfirm this c ho ic e  we  will no t a sk yo u 
a ny q ue stio ns, b ut yo u will a lso  no t re c e ive  the  p a rtic ip a tio n fe e . Wha t will b e  yo ur d e c isio n?  
IF YES: Tha nk yo u fo r a g re e ing  to  p a rtic ip a te . 
TREATMENT: Yo u will re c e ive  the  300/ 500 p e so s fo r yo ur p a rtic ip a tio n no w. [C OUNT THE MONEY AND 
HAND IT OVER].  
V0: WHERE DID THE PARTICIPANT PUT THE MONEY?  IN HER POC KET; 2 – IN HER BAG / PURSE; 3 – 
KEEPS IT IN HER HAND, 4 – OTHER, SPECIFY: ____. 
CO NTRO L: Yo u will re c e ive  the  300/ 500 p e so s fo r yo ur p a rtic ip a tio n la te r d uring  the  surve y. 
Le t’ s sta rt with the  surve y. Mo st o f the  q ue stio ns c a n b e  a nswe re d  with ‘ Ye s’  o r ‘ No ’  a nd  yo u d o  
no t ne e d  to  g ive  a n e xp la na tio n. 
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I1. Wha t is yo ur na me ?  [FIRST, MIDDLE, LAST] _______________________________________ 
I2. Did  yo u re c e ive  a n a nno unc e me nt le tte r tha t this inte rvie w wo uld  ta ke  p la c e ?   
1 Ye s 2 No  
 
I3. Are  yo u sing le , ma rrie d / living  with p a rtne r, se p a ra te d  o r wid o we d ?  
1 Sing le  2 Ma rrie d / living  with p a rtne r 
3 Se p a ra te d / d ivo rc e d  4 Wid o we d  
5 DON´T READ: REFUSED   
 
I4. Ho w ma ny p e rso ns inc lud ing  yo urse lf live  in yo ur ho use ho ld ?  (e xc lud e  g ue sts, visito rs, 
ho use ho ld  me mb e rs who  d o  no t sle e p  a t ho me  a t le a st o nc e  a  we e k) _________________________ 
 
I5. Ho w ma ny p e rso ns in yo ur ho use ho ld  inc lud ing  yo urse lf e a rn mo ne y?  ___________________ 
I6. Ho w ma ny p e rso ns in yo ur ho use ho ld  a re  c urre ntly a tte nd ing  sc ho o l?  ___________________ 
The  fo llo wing  q ue stio ns a re  a b o ut yo urse lf. 
I7. Ho w o ld  a re  yo u?  ___________________ 
I8. Wha t is the  hig he st fo rma l e d uc a tio n le ve l yo u ha ve  c o mp le te d ?  ___________________ 
Ed uc a tio n c o d e s 
0 No  sc ho o ling  1 Gra d e  1 2 Gra d e  2 3 Gra d e  3 4 Gra d e  4 
5 Gra d e  5 6 Ele me nta ry 
Gra d ua te  
7 Hig h sc ho o l 1 8 Hig h sc ho o l 2 9 Hig h sc ho o l 
3 
10 Hig h sc ho o l 4 11 Hig h sc ho o l 
g ra d ua te  
12 Vo c a tio na l 
Inc o mp le te  
13 Vo c a tio na l 
Co mp le te  
14 So me  
Co lle g e  
15 C o lle g e  
g ra d ua te  o r 
hig he r 
    
 
 
1 G o ve rnme nt o ffic ia l 2 Pro fe ssio na l o r te c hnic a l (no n-
p ro d uc tio n) 
3 Ad ministra tive  o r c le ric a l (p ub lic ) 4 Ad ministra tive  o r c le ric a l (p riva te ) 
5 Sa ri-sa ri sto re  o wne r 6 Tric yc le , je e p ne y, ta xi, o r o the r tra nsp o rt 
7 Fa rme rs, fishe rma n, hunte rs, lo g g e rs a nd  
re la te d  wo rke rs 
8 Mine rs, q ua rryme n a nd  re la te d  wo rke rs 
9 Cra ftsma n o r p ro d uc tio n-p ro c e ss 10 Pla nt a nd  ma c hine  o p e ra to rs a nd  
a sse mb le rs 
11 Wa g e  la b o re rs 12 Entre p re ne ur  
(>5 e mp lo ye e s): Se rvic e  
13 Entre p re ne ur  
(>5 e mp lo ye e s): Buy/ Se ll 
14 Mic ro e ntre p re ne ur  
(>5 e mp lo ye e s): Se rvic e  
15 Mic ro e ntre p re ne ur  
(>5 e mp lo ye e s): Buy/ Se ll 
16 Re tire d  p e rso nne l  
(G O & p riva te  o rg ) 
17 Ho use wo rke r (witho ut wa g e ), stud e nt 
une mp lo ye d  
 
18 Othe r 
19 No  ho use ho ld  inc o me  a t a ll  
Surve y 
I -  Ide ntific a tion  
 
H -  House hold inc ome  
51
Page 3 of 15 
 
H1. Wha t is yo ur ho use ho ld ’ s ma in so urc e  o f inc o me ?  [SOURCE THAT GIVES THE MOST INCOME] 
 
H2a .Ple a se  le t me  kno w, d o e s yo ur ho use ho ld  ha ve  a ny inc o me  fro m the  fo llo wing  so urc e s?  
1 Ye s 2 No  
 
Ne t b usine ss inc o me   
Fa rm inc o me   
La b o r wa g e s  
Pe nsio n  
Re mitta nc e s  
Go ve rnme nt a id / inc o me  sub sid y  
Re nta l  
Othe r inc o me  so urc e  (sp e c ify)  
 
[IF H2a  = YES, PRO CEED WITH H2b  FOR THIS C ATEGO RY] 
 
 H2b. Amo unt H2c . Time  unit 
1 – Da ily 
2 – We e kly 
3 – Mo nthly 
4 – Othe r 
sp e c ify 
H2d. Ho w is this 
inc o me  
re c e ive d ?  
1  – Ca sh 
2  – Che c k 
3  – De p o sit  
4  – Othe r, 
sp e c ify 
H2e . Is it e a sy to  
e stima te  ho w 
muc h inc o me  
yo u will re c e ive  
in the  ne xt 
mo nth?  
1 – Ye s 
2 – No  
3 – DON´T READ: 
DON´T KNOW 
4 – DON´T READ: 
REFUSED                            
Ne t b usine ss 
inc o me  
    
Fa rm inc o me      
La b o r wa g e s     
Pe nsio n     
Re mitta nc e s     
Go ve rnme nt 
a id / inc o me  
sub sid y 
    
Re nta l     
Othe r inc o me  
so urc e  (sp e c ify) 
    
 
 
H3a . This ne xt q ue stio n is a b o ut ho use ho ld  b ud g e ts. A ho use ho ld  b ud g e t is use d  to  d e c id e  wha t 
        sha re  o f yo ur ho use ho ld  inc o me  will b e  use d  fo r sp e nd ing , sa ving  o r p a ying  b ills.  
        Do e s yo ur ho use ho ld  ha ve  a  b ud g e t?      
1 Ye s 2 No  
 
H3b. [If H3a . = ye s]: Do  yo u usua lly stic k to  the  b ud g e t?  
1 Ye s 2 No  
3 DON´T READ: REFUSED  
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No w I` ll a sk yo u so me  q ue stio ns a b o ut yo ur e xp e nse s.  
 
E1. Ab o ut ho w muc h d id  yo u a nd  yo ur ho use ho ld  sp e nd  o n e ve rything  in the  la st 7 d a ys?  Ple a se  
      think a b o ut a ll b ills suc h a s re nt, lo a n p a yme nts, utility a nd  o the r b ills, a s we ll a s a ll e xp e nse s 
      suc h a s fo o d , c lo thing , tra nsp o rta tio n a nd  a ny o the r e xp e nse s yo u a nd  yo ur ho use ho ld  ma y 
      ha ve . _________________ p e so s 
 
E2. In a  typ ic a l we e k, ho w muc h o f yo ur o wn mo ne y d o  yo u sp e nd  fo o d  a nd  b e ve ra g e s?  
      _________________ p e so s 
 
E3. In a  typ ic a l we e k, ho w muc h o f yo ur o wn mo ne y d o  yo u sp e nd  o n no n-fo o d  ite ms suc h a s  
      p e rso na l p ro d uc ts, c le a ning  p ro d uc ts o r te xtile s?  _________________ p e so s 
 
E4. In a  typ ic a l mo nth, ho w muc h o f yo ur o wn mo ne y d o  yo u sp e nd  o n b ills?  
      _________________p e so s  
 
E5. In a  typ ic a l mo nth, ho w muc h o f yo ur o wn mo ne y d o  yo u sp e nd  o n me d ic ine  a nd  me d ic a l    
      e q uip me nt?  _________________ p e so s 
 
E6. In a  typ ic a l mo nth, ho w muc h o f yo ur o wn mo ne y d o  yo u sp e nd  o n e d uc a tio n?  
      _________________ p e so s 
 
E7. During  the  la st we e k, ho w muc h o f yo ur o wn mo ne y d id  yo u sp e nd  o n so me thing  a nd  
      a fte rwa rd s re g re tte d  sp e nd ing  the  mo ne y?  _________________ p e so s 
 
E8. Whic h ONE o f the  fo llo wing  b e st d e sc rib e s the  e xte nt to  whic h yo u p e rso na lly mo nito r yo ur 
      re g ula r e xp e nse s?  [READ OUT ALL OPTIONS] 
 
1 I d o n't ke e p  a n e ye  o n e xp e nse s a t a ll  2 I ke e p  my e ye  o n e xp e nse s a  b it 
3 Witho ut ke e p ing  writte n re c o rd s, I 
ke e p  a  fa irly c lo se  e ye  o n e xp e nse s 
4 I use  writte n re c o rd s to  ke e p  a  c lo se  e ye  
o n e xp e nse s 




A1. Ple a se  le t me  kno w whe the r yo ur ho use ho ld  ha s the  fo llo wing   
 




A1a . Ele c tric ity  A1h. Re frig e ra to r/ fre e ze r   
A1b. Running  wa te r  A1i. Wa shing  ma c hine   
A1c . Ra d io / ra d io  c a sse tte   A1j. CD o r VCD o r DVD p la ye r  
A1d. Te le visio n  A1k. Bic yc le  o r trisika d / p e d ic a b   
A1e . La nd line  te le p ho ne   A1l. Mo to rc yc le  o r tric yc le   
A1f. Ce llula r p ho ne   A1m. Anima l-d ra wn c a rt/ sle d g e   
A1g . Pe rso na l c o mp ute r o r 
la p to p  




E -  EXPENDITURES 
A -  Asse ts 
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A2. Who  in the  ho use ho ld  ma ke s the  fo llo wing  d e c isio ns, yo u, yo ur husb a nd / p a rtne r o r yo u a nd  
yo ur husb a nd / p a rtne r jo intly?   
0 Husb a nd  1 Jo int 
2 Se lf 4 Othe rs ma ke  the  d e c isio n 
 
A2a . Wha t to  b uy a t the  ma rke t  
A2b. Whe the r to  ma ke  a n e xp e nsive  p urc ha se  suc h a s TV  
A2c . Whe the r to  g ive  a ssista nc e  to  fa mily me mb e rs  
A2d. The  re c re a tio na l use  o f mo ne y  
A2e . Ho w the  mo ne y yo u p e rso na lly e a rne d  will b e  use d   
A2f. Put mo ne y a sid e  fo r sa ving s  
A2g . Numb e r o f c hild re n  





I will no w a sk yo u so me  q ue stio ns re g a rding  yo ur o wn b usine ss.  
 
O1. Do  yo u c urre ntly run yo ur o wn b usine ss?  [IF NO -> SKIP TO NEXT SEC TION] 
1 Ye s 2 No  
3 DON´T READ: REFUSED  
 
O2a . Do  yo u p la n yo ur b usine ss c a sh flo w?    
1 Ye s 2 No  
3 DON´T READ: REFUSED  
 
O2b . IF O2a =ye s: On whic h b a sis d o  yo u p la n yo ur b usine ss c a sh flo w?  
1 Da ily 2 We e kly 
3 Bi-we e kly 4 Mo nthly 
5 Bi-mo nthly 6 I d o n’ t p la n 
7 Othe r, sp e c ify: 8 DON´T READ: REFUSED 
 
 
O3. Ho w muc h d o  yo u a g re e  o r d isa g re e  with the  fo llo wing  sta te me nts?   
      1 stro ng ly a g re e , 2 a g re e , 3 ne ithe r a g re e  no r d isa g re e , 4 d isa g re e , 5 stro ng ly d isa g re e      
      [SHOW SC ALE] 
 
O3a . It is e a sy to  p la n ho w muc h mo ne y I c a n ma ke  in o ne  we e k fro m my b usine ss. [USE SC ALE] 
 
O3b. Wha t d o  yo u think: Ho w hig h will yo ur p e rso na l g ro ss b usine ss inc o me  in the  ne xt we e k b e ?  
 
O3c . It is e a sy to  p la n ho w muc h mo ne y I will ne e d  to  sp e nd  o n my b usine ss in o ne  we e k. [USE    
         SC ALE] 
 
O3d. Wha t d o  yo u think: During  the  ne xt we e k, ho w hig h will the  e xp e nd iture s fo r yo ur b usine ss  
          b e ?  _________________ p e so s 
 
O4. Ho w muc h c a sh d o  yo u typ ic a lly ne e d  to  ho ld  fo r yo ur b usine ss to  run smo o thly?  Fo r  
       e xa mp le , if yo u ha ve  a  sa ri-sa ri sto re , ho w muc h mo ne y d o  yo u ne e d  to  ho ld ?   
       _____________ p e so s 
 
O -  Own busine ss 
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No w, I ha ve  so me  ve ry g e ne ra l q ue stio ns fo r yo u. 
M1. Ge ne ra lly sp e a king , wo uld  yo u sa y tha t mo st p e o p le  c a n b e  truste d  o r tha t yo u ne e d  to  b e   
       ve ry c a re ful in d e a ling  with p e o p le ?  [READ O UT OPTIONS AND ENTER 1 OR 2] 
1 Mo st p e o p le  c a n b e  truste d  2 Ne e d  to  b e  ve ry c a re ful 
 
M2. Ho w lo ng  d o e s it ta ke  yo u to  g e t to  the  ASHI c e nte r me e ting ?  (o ne -wa y, in minute s) 
       ____________________ minute s 
M3. Ho w muc h d o e s it c o st yo u (e .g . fa re s) to  g e t to  the  ASHI c e nte r me e ting ?   



























M -  Misc  
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TREATMENT: Fo r p a rtic ip a tio n in this surve y, yo u ha ve  re c e ive d  300/ 500 p e so s. If yo u d e c id e  
to  sa ve  so me  o f this mo ne y no w in yo ur ASHI p e rso na l sa ving s a c c o unt a nd  the  a mo unt yo u 
d e p o site d  to d a y is still in yo ur a c c o unt in fo ur we e ks’  time , I will a d d  20% o f this a mo unt to  
yo ur sa ving s a c c o unt. Fo r e xa mp le , if yo u d e c id e  to  sa ve  100 p e so s a nd  in fo ur we e ks yo u 
still ha ve  a t le a st 100 p e so s in yo ur sa ving s a c c o unt, I will a d d  20 p e so s in fo ur we e ks’  time  to  
yo ur a c c o unt. This a d d itio na l p a yme nt is g ua ra nte e d  a nd  yo u will re c e ive  this c o nfirma tio n 
[SHOW CONFIRMATION SHEET]. If, inste a d , the re  is le ss tha n the  100 p e so s yo u d e c id e d  to  sa ve  
to d a y in yo ur sa ving s a c c o unt in fo ur we e ks, I will a d d  no thing  to  yo ur sa ving s a c c o unt. If 
yo u wa nt to  sa ve  so me  mo ne y, yo u ha nd  it to  me  a nd  I will p ut it in this e nve lo p e  a nd  se a l 
the  e nve lo p e . We  will g ive  the  e nve lo p e  to  the  DO still d uring  the  c e nte r me e ting  o nc e  we  
ha ve  finishe d  a ll inte rvie ws. Yo u c a n sa ve  a ny a mo unt yo u wa nt b e twe e n 0 a nd  300 p e so s 
in multip le s o f 1 p e so . 
Yo u ke e p  a ll the  mo ne y tha t yo u d o  no t wa nt to  sa ve . Do  yo u ha ve  a ny q ue stio ns?  [IF YES, 
CLARIFY]. Ple a se  no w ha nd  me  the  mo ne y yo u wa nt to  sa ve . [DO NOT PRESSURE HER TO GIVE YOU 
ANY MONEY. IF THE NANAY OFFERS YOU SOME MONEY, COUNT IT AND PLACE IT IN THE ENVELOPE, WRITE HER NAME 
ON THE ENVELOPE. NOTE THE AMOUNT SAVED ON THE SCREEN. IF SHE DECIDED TO SAVE: FILL IN ONE 
CONFIRMATION SHEET] 
D: Amo unt Sa ve d : _________________ 
   20 p e so  b ills: __________ 
   50 p e so  b ills: __________ 
   100 p e so  b ills: ___________ 
 
CO NTRO L: Fo r p a rtic ip a tio n in this surve y, yo u will re c e ive  300/ 500 p e so s. If yo u d e c id e  to  
sa ve  so me  o f this mo ne y no w in yo ur ASHI p e rso na l sa ving s a c c o unt a nd  the  a mo unt yo u 
d e p o site d  to d a y is still in yo ur a c c o unt in fo ur we e ks’  time , I will a d d  20% o f this a mo unt to  
yo ur sa ving s a c c o unt. Fo r e xa mp le , if yo u d e c id e  to  sa ve  100 p e so s a nd  in fo ur we e ks yo u 
still ha ve  a t le a st 100 p e so s in yo ur sa ving s a c c o unt, I will a d d  20 p e so s in fo ur we e ks’  time  to  
yo ur a c c o unt. If, inste a d , the re  is le ss tha n the  100 p e so s yo u d e c id e d  to  sa ve  to d a y in yo ur 
sa ving s a c c o unt in fo ur we e ks, I will a d d  no thing  to  yo ur sa ving s a c c o unt. The  a d d itio na l 
p a yme nt a fte r fo ur we e ks is g ua ra nte e d , yo u will re c e ive  this writte n c o nfirma tio n [SHOW 
CONFIRMATION SHEET]. If yo u wa nt to  sa ve  so me  mo ne y, I will p ut it in this e nve lo p e  a nd  se a l the  
e nve lo p e . We  will g ive  the  e nve lo p e  to  the  DO  still d uring  the  c e nte r me e ting  o nc e  we  
ha ve  finishe d  a ll inte rvie ws. Yo u c a n sa ve  a ny a mo unt yo u wa nt b e twe e n 0 a nd  300 p e so s 
in multip le s o f 1 p e so . 
I will g ive  yo u a ll the  mo ne y tha t yo u d o  no t wa nt to  sa ve  a fte r p re p a ring  the  e nve lo p e . Do  
yo u ha ve  a ny q ue stio ns?  [IF YES, CLARIFY] Ple a se  no w te ll me  whe the r a nd  if ye s, ho w muc h 
mo ne y yo u wa nt to  sa ve . [TAKE OUT ALL THE C ASH, CO UNT IT, PLACE THE SUM THE NANAY WANTED TO SAVE 
IN THE ENVELOPE, WRITE HER NAME ON THE ENVELOPE AND HAND THE REST OF THE MONEY TO HER. NOTE THE 
AMOUNT SAVED ON THE SCREEN. IF SHE DECIDED TO SAVE: FILL IN ONE CONFIRMATION SHEET] 
D: Amo unt Sa ve d : _________________ 
 
  
D -  De c ision 
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The  fo llo wing  se t o f q ue stio ns fo rm p a rt o f a  g a me  in whic h yo u c a n e a rn a d d itio na l mo ne y. 
Ap p ro xima te ly 1 o ut o f 6 p e o p le  will a c tua lly b e  pa id  fo r o ne  o f the se  q ue stio ns a t the  e nd  o f 
the  inte rvie w. We  will ma ke  a  luc ky d ra w a t the  e nd  o f the  surve y to  d e te rmine  who m o f the  
p a rtic ip a nts will b e  p a id . Yo u d o n’ t kno w whe the r yo u will b e  o ne  o f the  luc ky o ne s a nd  
whic h q ue stio n yo u mig ht b e  p a id  fo r. The re fo re , yo u sho uld  ma ke  a ll o f yo ur c ho ic e s a s if yo u 
a re  g o ing  to  g e t e a c h re wa rd . So  p le a se  re a lly think a b o ut whic h re wa rd  yo u p re fe r fo r e a c h 
q ue stio n. 
The  fo llo wing  q ue stio ns will a sk yo u whe the r yo u wa nt P50 no w, o r a  d iffe re nt a mo unt o f 
mo ne y in two  we e ks. All a mo unts will b e  p a id  with mo b ile  p ho ne  lo a d . If yo u a re  p a id , we  will 
re c o rd  yo ur mo b ile  p ho ne  numb e r a t the  e nd  o f the  surve y. If yo u d o n’ t ha ve  a  mo b ile  
p ho ne , yo u c a n g ive  us the  numb e r o f a  fa mily me mb e r o r frie nd .  
If a  q ue stio n is se le c te d  whe re  yo u c ho se  P50 no w, the n we  will tra nsfe r P50 o f lo a d  to d a y. If a  
q ue stio n is se le c te d  whe re  yo u c ho o se  a n a mo unt in 2 we e ks, the n we  will tra nsfe r tha t 
a mo unt in 2 we e ks. This p a yme nt is g ua ra nte e d . We  will a lso  g ive  yo u a  p a p e r vo uc he r 
(SHOW VOUCHER) whic h sta te s yo ur na me , the  a mo unt, a nd  the  d a te  whe n we  se nd  the  
lo a d . We  will a lso  g ive  yo u a  numb e r yo u c a n c o nta c t if yo ur p ho ne  numb e r c ha ng e s. Do  
yo u ha ve  a ny q ue stio ns o n this b e fo re  I sta rt?  
[INSTRUCTORS: 
- ASK EACH QUESTION SEPARATELY. LET THEM THINK ABO UT EACH O NE. 
- DO NO T SHORTEN OR ABBREVIATE THE Q UESTIONS IN ANY WAY 
- AVOID SWITCHING BAC K AND FORTH. IF RESPONDENT SWITCHES BAC K AND FO RTH; CHECK 
THEY UNDERSTO OD THE Q UESTION.] 
Whic h o p tio n d o  yo u p re fe r?  
1 No w 2 La te r 
 
Ex1a . Do  yo u p re fe r P50 g ua ra nte e d  to d a y o r P40 p e so s in 2 we e ks?      
Ex1b . Do  yo u p re fe r P50 g ua ra nte e d  to d a y o r P50 p e so s in 2 we e ks?      
Ex1c . Do  yo u p re fe r P50 g ua ra nte e d  to d a y o r P60 p e so s in 2 we e ks?      
Ex1d . Do  yo u p re fe r P50 g ua ra nte e d  to d a y o r P75 p e so s in 2 we e ks?      
Ex1e . Do  yo u p re fe r P50 g ua ra nte e d  to d a y o r P100 p e so s in 2 we e ks?     
Ex1f.  Do  yo u p re fe r P50 g ua ra nte e d  to d a y o r P125 p e so s in 2 we e ks?     
Ex1g . Do  yo u p re fe r P50 g ua ra nte e d  to d a y o r P150 p e so s in 2 we e ks?    
Ex1h. Do  yo u p re fe r P50 g ua ra nte e d  to d a y o r P200 p e so s in 2 we e ks?     
 
I will no w a sk yo u to  c o mp a re  d iffe re nt kind s o f lo tte rie s. The re  will a lwa ys b e  a  lo tte ry A a nd  a  
lo tte ry B. If yo u d e c id e  to  p la y lo tte ry A a nd  this q ue stio n is se le c te d , we  will a c tua lly p la y 
lo tte ry A a nd  yo u will win the  mo ne y fro m tha t lo tte ry. All lo tte rie s c a n b e  se le c te d  fo r 
p a yme nt, so  think ha rd  a b o ut whic h lo tte ry yo u p re fe r.  
Le t me  g ive  yo u a n e xa mp le  o f suc h a  lo tte ry. He re , yo u c a n se e  o ne  lo tte ry A. Ea c h lo tte ry 
will c o nsist o f 10 b a lls a nd  b a lls c a n b e  o f two  d iffe re nt c o lo rs a nd  o f d iffe re nt va lue . He re , we  
ha ve  thre e  ye llo w b a lls, tha t a re  e a c h wo rth 100 p e so s a nd  se ve n re d  b a lls wo rth 50 p e so s. 
So , the  c ha nc e  o f winning  100 p e so s is thre e  in te n a nd  the  c ha nc e  o f winning  50 p e so s is 
se ve n in te n. If this q ue stio n is se le c te d  fo r p a yme nt a nd  yo u wa nt to  p la y lo tte ry A, the n we  
will d ra w o ne  b a ll fro m a n o p a q ue  b a g . If it is ye llo w, yo u will re c e ive  100 p e so s, if the  b a ll is 
re d , yo u will re c e ive  50 p e so s. Do  yo u ha ve  a ny q ue stio ns?  
No w le t's c o mp a re  the  first two  lo tte rie s. This is o nly fo r p ra c tic e  a nd  the re  will b e  no  p a yme nt 
fo r this c o mp a riso n. Lo tte ry A ha s a  thre e  in te n c ha nc e  o f winning  100 p e so s a nd  a  se ve n in 
te n c ha nc e  o f winning  50 p e so s. Lo tte ry B ha s a  five  in te n c ha nc e  o f winning  100 p e so s a nd  




PART 2: Expe rime nta l Pre fe re nc e   
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Ex2a . Whic h lo tte ry d o  yo u p re fe r?   A o r  B 
No w le t's c o mp a re  the  first two  lo tte rie s tha t yo u ma y p la y a t the  e nd  o f the  surve y. He re , the re  
is no  rig ht o r wro ng . 
Lo tte ry A ha s a  o ne  in te n c ha nc e  o f winning  150 p e so s a nd  a  nine  in te n c ha nc e  o f winning  
100 p e so s. Lo tte ry B ha s a  o ne  in te n c ha nc e  o f winning  250 p e so s a nd  a  nine  in te n c ha nc e  o f 
winning  10 p e so s. 
Ex2b. Whic h lo tte ry d o  yo u p re fe r?   A o r  B 
No w c ha nc e s fo r winning  the  hig h p ric e  inc re a se  in b o th lo tte rie s. 
Lo tte ry A ha s a  two  in te n c ha nc e  o f winning  150 p e so s a nd  a n e ig ht in te n c ha nc e  o f winning  
100 p e so s. Lo tte ry B ha s a  two  in te n c ha nc e  o f winning  250 p e so s a nd  a n e ig ht in te n c ha nc e  
o f 10 p e so s. 
Ex2c . Whic h lo tte ry d o  yo u p re fe r?   A o r  B 
[CO NTINUES UNTIL CHANCE OF WINNING THE HIGH AMOUNT IS 9 IN 10] 
The  fo llo wing  q ue stio ns a sk yo u to  c ho o se  b e twe e n 50 p e so s no w, a nd  a  d iffe re nt a mo unt in 4 
we e ks fro m no w. As b e fo re , yo u mig ht g e t pa id  fo r o ne  o f the se  q ue stio ns in lo a d . The  
p a yme nt is g ua ra nte e d . So  p le a se  re a lly think a b o ut whic h re wa rd  yo u p re fe r fo r e a c h 
q ue stio n.  
1 No w 2 La te r 
 
Ex3a . Do  yo u p re fe r P50 g ua ra nte e d  to d a y o r P40 p e so s in 4 we e ks?     
Ex3b . Do  yo u p re fe r P50 g ua ra nte e d  to d a y o r P50 p e so s in 4 we e ks?     
Ex3c . Do  yo u p re fe r P50 g ua ra nte e d  to d a y o r P60 p e so s in 4 we e ks?      
Ex3d. Do  yo u p re fe r P50 g ua ra nte e d  to d a y o r P75 p e so s in 4 we e ks?     
Ex3e . Do  yo u p re fe r P50 g ua ra nte e d  to d a y o r P100 p e so s in 4 we e ks?     
Ex3f.  Do  yo u p re fe r P50 g ua ra nte e d  to d a y o r P125 p e so s in 4 we e ks?    
Ex3g . Do  yo u p re fe r P50 g ua ra nte e d  to d a y o r P150 p e so s in 4 we e ks?    
Ex3h. Do  yo u p re fe r P50 g ua ra nte e d  to d a y o r P200 p e so s in 4 we e ks?   
 
I will no w a sk yo u whe the r yo u a re  willing  to  p la y d iffe re nt kind s o f lo tte rie s. In e a c h lo tte ry, yo u 
c a n lo se  so me  mo ne y o r yo u c a n win so me  mo ne y. If yo u d e c id e  fo r lo tte ry A a nd  this q ue stio n 
is se le c te d , we  will p la y lo tte ry A. If yo u win a  lo tte ry, I will g ive  yo u the  a d d itio na l mo ne y. If yo u 
lo se  a  lo tte ry, I will a sk yo u to  p a y fo r it fro m yo ur p a rtic ip a tio n fe e . All lo tte rie s c a n b e  se le c te d  
fo r p a yme nt, so  think ha rd  whic h o ne  yo u p re fe r.  
No w le t's c o mp a re  the  first two  lo tte rie s tha t yo u ma y p la y a t the  e nd  o f the  surve y. Ag a in, 
the re  is no  rig ht o r wro ng . 
Lo tte ry A ha s a  five  in te n c ha nc e  o f winning  60 pe so s a nd  a  five  in te n c ha nc e  o f lo sing  35 
p e so s. Lo tte ry B ha s a  five  in te n c ha nc e  o f winning  75 p e so s a nd  a  five  in te n c ha nc e  o f lo sing  





Ex4a . Whic h lo tte ry d o  yo u p re fe r?   A o r  B 
No w the  a mo unts tha t yo u c a n win o r lo se  c ha ng e . Cha nc e s sta y the  sa me  a s b e fo re . 
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Lo tte ry A ha s a  five  in te n c ha nc e  o f winning  55 p e so s a nd  a  five  in te n c ha nc e  o f lo sing  35 
p e so s. Lo tte ry B ha s a  five  in te n c ha nc e  o f winning  75 p e so s a nd  a  five  in te n c ha nc e  o f lo sing  
65 p e so s. 
Ex4b . Whic h lo tte ry d o  yo u p re fe r?   A o r  B 
 [C ONTINUES WITH  
- LOTTERY A: +50, -35; LO TTERY B: +75, -65 
- LOTTERY A: +45, -35; LO TTERY B: +75, -65 
- LOTTERY A: +40, -35; LO TTERY B: +75, -50 
- LOTTERY A: +40, -35; LO TTERY B: +75, -45 
- LOTTERY A: +35, -35; LO TTERY B: +75, -40] 
The  fo llo wing  q ue stio ns a sk yo u to  c ho o se  b e twe e n 50 p e so s in two  we e ks fro m no w, a nd  a  
d iffe re nt a mo unt in 4 we e ks fro m no w. As b e fo re , yo u mig ht g e t p a id  fo r o ne  o f the se  q ue stio ns 
in lo a d . The  p a yme nt is g ua ra nte e d . So  p le a se  re a lly think a b o ut whic h re wa rd  yo u p re fe r fo r 
e a c h q ue stio n. 
Whic h o p tio n d o  yo u p re fe r?  
2 We e ks 4 We e ks 
 
Ex5a . Do  yo u p re fe r P50 g ua ra nte e d  in 2 we e ks o r P40 p e so s in 4 we e ks?   
Ex5b . Do  yo u p re fe r P50 g ua ra nte e d  in 2 we e ks o r P50 p e so s in 4 we e ks?      
Ex5c . Do  yo u p re fe r P50 g ua ra nte e d  in 2 we e ks o r P60 p e so s in 4 we e ks?     
Ex5d. Do  yo u p re fe r P50 g ua ra nte e d  in 2 we e ks o r P75 p e so s in 4 we e ks?   
Ex5e . Do  yo u p re fe r P50 g ua ra nte e d  in 2 we e ks o r P100 p e so s in 4 we e ks?    
Ex5f.  Do  yo u p re fe r P50 g ua ra nte e d  in 2 we e ks o r P125 p e so s in 4 we e ks?    
Ex5g . Do  yo u p re fe r P50 g ua ra nte e d  in 2 we e ks o r P150 p e so s in 4 we e ks?     







I will no w a sk yo u so me  q ue stio ns a b o ut yo ur ho use ho ld 's fina nc e s, whe the r yo u so me time s 
e nc o unte r d iffic ultie s a nd  ho w yo u d e a l with the m. 
 
EM1a . Do e s yo ur ho use ho ld  ha ve  mo ne y le ft o ve r a t the  e nd  o f the  we e k a fte r yo u ha ve  p a id   
           fo r fo o d  a nd  o the r ne c e ssitie s?    
1 Ye s, re g ula rly   2 Ye s, so me time s  
3 No  4 DON´T READ: REFUSED 
 
EM1b. IF YES: Wha t d o e s yo ur ho use ho ld  d o  with this le ft o ve r mo ne y?  [DO N`T READ; MAX. 3  
           ENTER 1-3 IN O RDER OF MENTIONING] 
1 Sp e nd  o n utility b ills 2 Sp e nd  o n fo o d  
3 Sp e nd  o n sc ho o l fe e s 4 Sp e nd  o n tre a ts (swe e ts, Jo llib e e , to ys) 
5 Sp e nd  o n a p p lia nc e s 6 Le nd  to  re la tive  
7 Le nd  to  frie nd  8 Le nd  to  ne ig hb o r 
9 Do na te  to  re la tive / frie nd / ne ig hb o r 10 Inve st in b usine ss 
11 Pa y o ff lo a n 12 Sa ve  a t ho me  
13 Sa ve  in ASHI 14 Sa ve  in institutio n (o the r tha n ASHI) 
15 Othe r, sp e c ify:   
 
Pa rt 3 
 
EM -  EXCESS MO NEY 
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EM2. Do e s yo ur ho use ho ld  e ve r run sho rt o f mo ne y fo r fo o d  o r o the r ne c e ssa ry ite ms?  
1 Ye s, re g ula rly   2 Ye s, so me time s  
3 Se ld o m 4 No  
5 DON´T READ: REFUSED  
 
EM3a . Do  yo u b e lie ve  tha t yo ur ho use ho ld 's d a y-to -d a y fina nc e s' (d e a ling  with ro utine  e xp e nse s  
           fo r e xa mp le  fo r fo o d  a nd  o the r ne c e ssitie s, lo a n re p a yme nt, sc ho o l a llo wa nc e ,  
           tra nsp o rta tio n e tc .) wo uld  imp ro ve  if yo ur ho use ho ld  p a id  mo re  a tte ntio n to  the m?  [READ  
              OUT ANSWER POSSIBILITIES] 
1  Ye s, a nd  I/ we  o fte n re g re t no t p a ying  
g re a te r a tte ntio n 
2 Ye s, b ut p a ying  mo re  a tte ntio n wo uld  re q uire  
to o  muc h time / e ffo rt  
3 No , my ho use ho ld  fina nc e s a re  se t up  so  
tha t the y d o n't re q uire  muc h a tte ntio n 
4 No , my ho use ho ld  is a lre a d y ve ry a tte ntive  to  
the se  ma tte rs 
 
EM3b. Do  yo u b e lie ve  tha t yo ur ho use ho ld 's me dium-run fina nc e s' (d e a ling  with p e rio d ic   
           e xp e nse s like  ho use  re p a ir, sc ho o l fe e s e tc .) wo uld  imp ro ve  if yo ur ho use ho ld  p a id  mo re   
           a tte ntio n to  the m?  
1  Ye s, a nd  I/ we  o fte n re g re t no t p a ying  
g re a te r a tte ntio n 
2 Ye s, b ut p a ying  mo re  a tte ntio n wo uld  re q uire  
to o  muc h time / e ffo rt  
3 No , my ho use ho ld  fina nc e s a re  se t up  so  
tha t the y d o n't re q uire  muc h a tte ntio n 
4 No , my ho use ho ld  is a lre a d y ve ry a tte ntive  to  




I will no w a sk yo u a b o ut diffe re nt hyp o the tic a l situa tio ns a nd wha t yo u wo uld do  in the se  
situa tio ns.  
Q1. Ima g ine  yo u ha ve  3000p hp  in c a sh. Wha t wo uld  yo u d o  with the  mo ne y?  [DO N`T READ;  
       MAX. 3 O RDER 1-3 IN ORDER OF MENTIONING] 
1 Sp e nd  o n utility b ills 2 Sp e nd  o n sc ho o l fe e s 
3 Sp e nd  o n fo o d  4 Sp e nd  o n tre a ts (swe e ts, Jo llib e e , to ys) 
5 Sp e nd  o n a p p lia nc e s 6 Le nd  to  re la tive  
7 Le nd  to  frie nd  8 Le nd  to  ne ig hb o r 
9 Do na te  to  re la tive / frie nd / ne ig hb o r 10 Inve st in b usine ss 
11 Pa y o ff lo a n 12 Sa ve  a t ho me  
13 Sa ve  in ASHI 14 Sa ve  in institutio n (o the r tha n ASHI) 
15 Othe r, sp e c ify:   
 
Q2. I will no w a sk yo u to  ma ke  two  d e c isio ns. The re  is no  rig ht o r wro ng  a nd  the re  is no  p a yme nt  
       invo lve d . Ple a se  e xa mine  b o th d e c isio ns a nd  the n le t me  kno w whic h o f the  o p tio ns yo u  
       p re fe r.  
 
       De c isio n 1: A winning  100 fo r sure  O R B a  5 in 10 c ha nc e  o f lo sing  300 a nd  a  5 in 10 c ha nc e   
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De c isio n 2: C  lo sing  400 fo r sure  O R D a  5 in 10 c ha nc e  o f lo sing  900 a nd  a  5 in 10 c ha nc e  








Q2a . De c isio n 1:  A  o r  B  Q2b. De c isio n 2: C  o r  D 
 
 
The  ne xt se t o f q ue stio ns will c o nc e rn yo ur sa ving s, whe re  a nd ho w muc h yo u sa ve . 
 
SI1. Do  yo u ha ve  c a sh sa ving s he ld  a t ho me  fo r sa fe  ke e p ing ?  If ye s, ho w muc h d o  yo u ha ve  in  
       sa ving s rig ht no w in the  fo rm o f c a sh a t ho me ?  [WRITE 00 IF NO NE] 
       _________________ p e so s 
SI2. Do  yo u ke e p  mo ne y with yo ur frie nd s/ fa mily o r e mp lo ye r fo r sa fe ke e p ing ?  If ye s, ho w muc h?    
      [WRITE 0 IF NO NE] 
      ______________ p e so s 
SI3. Do  yo u c urre ntly ha ve  a ny mo ne y le nt o ut to  o the rs?  If ye s, ho w muc h?  [WRITE 0 IF NO NE,   
       DO NO T C OUNT MO NEY GIFTS TO FRIENDS/ FAMILY IF THE WILL NOT GET IT BACK. DO  NOT  
       C OUNT MO NEY GIVEN TO O THERS ONLY FO R SAFEKEEPING] 
       _______________ p e so s 
SI4a . Ho w muc h mo ne y d o  yo u c urre ntly ha ve  in yo ur AHSI p e rso na l sa ving s?  
       ___________ p e so s 
SI4b. Ho w muc h mo ne y fro m yo ur la st lo a n d o  yo u still ha ve  in yo ur e le c tro nic  c a rd ?  
       ________________ p e so s 
SI5. Do  ho  ha ve  sa ving s a t a  b a nk, MFI, c o o p  o r o the r fo rma l institutio n o the r tha n ASHI?  If ye s,   
       ho w muc h?  
       ________________ p e so s 
SI6. Are  yo u c urre ntly a  me mb e r o f a ny sa ving s o rg a niza tio n with me mb e r c o ming  fro m yo ur  
       c hurc h, ne ig hb o rs, o r frie nd s?  If ye s, ho w muc h mo ne y d o  yo u c urre ntly ha ve  in sa ving s in  
       the se  o rg a niza tio ns?  [WRITE 0 IF NONE] 
       _________________  
SI7. Do  yo u ha ve  sa ving s in the  fo rm o f g o ld  (o r je we lrie s ma d e  o f g o ld ) a t ho me ?  
1 Ye s 2 No  
3 DON´T READ: DON´T KNOW 4 DON´T READ: REFUSED 
 
SI9. If yo u wa nt to  sa ve  a t ho me  o r a t yo ur p la c e  o f wo rk, d o  yo u ha ve  a  sa fe  p la c e  whe re  no   
      o ne  will ta ke  it a wa y?    
1 Ye s 2 No  
3 DON´T READ: REFUSED  
 
SI10. In g e ne ra l, a re  yo u a b le  to  sa ve  a s muc h a s yo u wa nt?     
1 Ye s 2 No  
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SG1a . Do  yo u c urre ntly sa ve  mo ne y?   
1 Ye s 2 No  
3 DON´T READ: REFUSED  
 
SG1b. If SG1a =Ye s: Wha t is the  ma in re a so n yo u sa ve ?  [MAX 3, RANK 1-3] 
1 Ca p ita l fo r b usine ss 2 Christma s, b irthd a ys (re g ula r c e le b ra tio ns) 
3 We d d ing s, b a p tisms, to wn fie sta s, a nd  
func tio ns 
4 Une xp e c te d  Eme rg e nc ie s (illne ss, sud d e n 
lo ss o f inc o me  e tc ) 
5 Re p a y a no the r d e b t 6 Sc ho o l fe e s/ e d uc a tio n 
7 Pe rso na l use  (e nte rta inme nt, c lo the s, 
e tc ) 
8 He a lth/ Me d ic a l Co sts 
9 Ce ll p ho ne , a p p lia nc e , TV, e tc  10 Utility b ills (g a s, wa te r, e le c tric ity e tc ) 
11 Future  ne e d s, e .g . re tire me nt 12 Fo r na tura l d isa ste r (e .g . typ ho o n) 
13 Ho use  C o nstruc tio n/ re p a ir 14 Othe r (sp e c ify): 
 
If SG1a =NO : Why d o n’ t yo u sa fe ?  [MAX 1-3, RANK 1-3] 
1 No t e no ug h mo ne y to  sa ve  2 I d o n’ t ne e d  it 
3 The re  a re  to o  ma ny d o c ume nta ry 
re q uire me nts 
4 I ha d  a  b a d  e xp e rie nc e  in the  p a st 
5 It is to o  e xp e nsive  6 I d o n’ t ha ve  kno wle d g e  a b o ut sa ving s 
7 Othe r, sp e c ify:  
 
SG2. I will no w a sk yo u to  ma ke  two  d e c isio ns. The re  is no  rig ht o r wro ng  a nd  the re  is no  p a yme nt  
         invo lve d . Ple a se  e xa mine  b o th d e c isio ns a nd  the n le t me  kno w whic h o f the  o p tio ns yo u  
         p re fe r. 
         De c isio n 1: winning  850 fo r sure  O R a  5 in 10 c ha nc e  o f winning  100 a nd  a  5 in 10 c ha nc e  o f        
         winning  1600 
         De c isio n 2: lo sing  650 fo r sure  OR a  5 in 10 c ha nc e  o f lo sing  1550 a nd  a  5 in 10 c ha nc e  o f  
         winning  100 
 
SG2a . De c isio n 1:  A  o r  B  SG2b. De c isio n 2: C  o r  D 
 
 
I will no w a sk yo u a  se t o f q ue stio ns c o nc e rning  yo ur o p inio n a nd e xp e rie nc e s with sa ving s. 
 
Ple a se  le t me  kno w ho w muc h yo u a g re e  o r d isa g re e  with the  fo llo wing  sta te me nts a nd  
q ue stio ns. Do  yo u fully a g re e , a g re e , ne ithe r a g re e  no r d isa g re e , d isa g re e  o r fully d isa g re e ?   
[C ODE: 1 FULLY AGREE, 2 AGREE, 3 NEITHER AGREE NOR DISAGREE, 4 DISAGREE, 5 FULLY DISAGREE] 
AS1. Ke e p ing  mo ne y a sid e  fo r a  p urp o se  is imp o rta nt fo r me   
AS2. Sa ving  a t ho me  is no t sa fe   
AS3. Ba nks c a nno t b e  truste d   
AS4. If I ha ve  sa ving s with ASHI, I will ne e d  to  sp e nd  it o n a b o no ha n fo r o the rs.  
AS5. Sa ving s a re  no t use ful  
AS6. Sa ving  a t ASHI is no t sa fe   
AS7. I wo uld  sa ve  mo re  b ut my husb a nd  ne e d s the  mo ne y   
AS8. I wo uld  like  to  sa ve  mo re  b ut c a sh c re a te s ne e d s  
AS9. I wo uld  like  to  sa ve  b ut I fo rg e t to  ke e p  mo ne y a sid e   
AS10. I wo uld  like  to  sa ve  b ut the n unfo re se e n e xp e nd iture s a re  ne e d e d   
AS11. I wo uld  sa ve  mo re  if my ASHI g ro up  me mb e rs sa ve d  mo re   
AS12. Using  my ASHI sa ving s a c c o unt ta ke s to o  muc h time   
AS13. I ha ve  e xp e rie nc e d  p ro b le ms with my sa ving s in ASHI  
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AS14. If I ha ve  sa ving s with ASHI, I will no t re c e ive  a b o no ha n fro m o the rs.  
AS15. I c a nno t a c c e ss my sa ving s whe n I ne e d  the m a s the  c e nte r me e ting  is o nly o nc e  
a  we e k. 
 
AS16. If I sa ve , I will o nly e nd  up  g iving  the  mo ne y to  my fa mily a nd  frie nd s.  
AS17. Whe n I ha ve  so me  sa ving s, I will to  so o n ta ke  the  mo ne y a nd  sp e nd  it.  
AS18. If I ha ve  c a sh, I think a b o ut wha t I c a n b uy b ut I do n’ t think a b o ut sa ving s.  
AS19. I wish I ha d  a  sa ving s a c c o unt whe re  I c o uld  hid e  my mo ne y fro m o the rs  




K1. Wha t is the  sa fe st p la c e  to  ke e p  yo ur sa ving s?  
 
1 At ho me  2 With frie nd s/ fa mily 3 With e mp lo ye r 
4 At ASHI 5 At Ba nk 6 Sa ving s a re  ne ve r sa fe  
 
K2. Wha t is the  mo st p ro fita b le  p la c e  to  ke e p  yo ur sa ving s?  
1 At ho me  2 With frie nd s/ fa mily 3 With e mp lo ye r 
4 At ASHI 5 At Ba nk 6 Sa ving s a re  ne ve r 
p ro fita b le  
 
K3. Ho w la rg e  is this inte re st ra te  yo u c a n g e t in yo ur AHSI p e rso na l sa ving s a c c o unt?  
      ______________ % 
K4. Ho w muc h mo ne y d o  yo u ne e d  to  ke e p  in yo ur ASHI p e rso na l sa ving s a c c o unt to  re c e ive   
      so me  inte re st?   
      ____________________ p e so s 
K5. Ho w ma ny p e o p le  in yo ur ASHI g ro up  sa ve ?  ________________ 
K6. Ho w ma ny p e o p le  in yo ur AHSI c e nte r sa ve ?  ________________ 
K7. In the  la st fo ur we e ks, ho w o fte n we re  sa ving s use d  fo r a b o no ha n in yo ur c e nte r?  
1 Ne ve r 2 Onc e  3 Twic e  
4 Thre e  time s 5 Fo ur time s 6 Mo re  tha n fo ur time s 
7 Do n´t kno w 8 DON´T READ: REFUSED  
 
K8. Do  yo ur g ro up  me mb e rs kno w ho w muc h mo ne y yo u c urre ntly ke e p  in yo ur AHSI p e rso na l  
      sa ving s a c c o unt?  
1 The y d o  no t no w 2 The y ha ve  a  va g ue  id e a  3 The y kno w e xa c tly 
4 DON´T READ: REFUSED    
 
 
The  ne xt se t o f q ue stio ns c o nc e rn d iffe re nt fina nc ia l c o nc e p ts tha t yo u mig h b e  fa milia r with. 
Ple a se  ta ke  yo ur time  to  think a b o ut e a c h q ue stio n. 
 
FL1. Ima g ine  tha t five  b ro the rs a re  g ive n a  g ift o f 1,000 PHP. If the  b ro the rs ha ve  to  d ivid e  the  
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FL2. No w, ima g ine  tha t the  five  b ro the rs ha ve  to  wa it fo r o ne  ye a r to  g e t the ir p a rt o f the  1,000 
PHP a nd  infla tio n sta ys a t 10%. In o ne  ye a r’ s time  will the y b e  a b le  to  b uy: 
 
1 Mo re  with the ir sha re  o f mo ne y tha n 
the y c o uld  to d a y 
2 The  sa me  a mo unt 
3 Le ss tha n the y c o uld  b uy to d a y 4 It d e p e nd s o n the  typ e s o f thing s tha t 
the y wa nt to  b uy [DO NOT READ OUT THIS 
OPTION] 
5 DON`T READ: EXPLAIN INFLATIO N  6 DON`T READ: REFUSED 
 
[IF FL2=”EXPLAIN INFLATION” , READ “ INFLATIO N MEASURES THE AVERAGE PRICE INCREASE OF 
COMMODITIES” , THEN ASK THE Q UESTION AG AIN] 
FL3. Sup p o se  yo u p ut 100 PHP into  a  sa ving s a c c o unt with a  g ua ra nte e d  inte re st ra te  o f 2% p e r 
ye a r. Yo u d o n’ t ma ke  a ny furthe r p a yme nts into  this a c c o unt a nd  yo u d o n’ t withd ra w a ny 
mo ne y. Ho w muc h wo uld  b e  in the  a c c o unt a t the  e nd  o f the  first ye a r, o nc e  the  inte re st 
p a yme nt is ma d e ?  _______________ 
 
FL4. Whic h o f the  fo llo wing  sta te me nts b e st d e sc rib e s the  p rima ry p urp o se  o f insura nc e  
p ro d uc ts?  
1 To  a c c umula te  sa ving s 2 To  p ro te c t a g a inst risks 
3 To  ma ke  p a yme nts o r se nd  mo ne y 4 Othe r 
5 DON´T READ: DON´T KNOW 6 DON´T READ; REFUSED  
 
FL5. Ho w hig h is infla tio n c urre ntly in the  Philip p ine s?  _________________% 
 
This is the  e nd  o f the  surve y. We  will no w d e te rmine  whe the r yo u re c e ive  a d d itio na l p a yme nt 
fo r o ne  o f yo ur p a id  g a me  c ho ic e s in the  surve y. Ple a se  ro ll this d ie . If it sho ws a  “ 6” , yo u will b e  
p a id  fo r o ne  o f yo ur c ho ic e s. [ENTER NUMBER IN SCREEN AND FOLLOW INSTRUC TIONS] 
[IF SELECTED FO R PAYMENT] We  will no w d e c id e  whic h o ne  o f the  p a id  g a me  q ue stio ns we  will 
p a y yo u fo r. Ple a se  d ra w a  numb e r fro m this b a g . [ENTER NUMBER IN SCREEN AND FOLLOW 
INSTRUC TIONS] Yo ur [xth] q ue stio n ha s b e e n se le c te d . The  q ue stio ns wa s [READ FROM SC REEN] 
a nd  yo u se le c te d  [READ FROM SC REEN]. 
[IF SELECTED LO TTERY]: we  will no w p la y the  lo tte ry yo u ha ve  se le c te d . I p la c e  [X] white  c hip s in 
this b a g , symb o lizing  the  [C OLOR1] b a lls a nd  [Y] b lue / re d  c hip s to  symb o lize  the  [CO LO R2] 
b a lls. Ple a se  no w d ra w a  c hip  fro m the  b a g . [ENTER CHIP CO LO R] yo u win a n a d d itio na l [X] 
p e so s/  yo u lo se  [X] p e so s. 
[IF SELECTED LO AD QUESTION]: yo u will re c e ive  [x] p e so s in lo a d  [no w/ in 2 we e ks/ in 4 we e ks]. 
[FILL IN THE VOUCHER AC CO RDINGLY, NOTE PHO NE NUMBER IN TABLET] 
[FO R EVERYONE] Yo ur to ta l e a rning s a re  [READ FROM TABLET], 300/ 500 p e so s fo r yo ur 
p a rtic ip a tio n a nd  [X] pe so s fro m the  g a me s. Ple a se  sig n he re  tha t yo u ha ve  re c e ive d  this 
a mo unt [USE RECEIPT; EVERYONE NEEDS TO SIGN A RECEIPT, ALSO THOSE WHO DID NOT WIN 
ADDITIONAL MO NEY].  
We  will no w g o  b a c k to  the  c e nte r me e ting .  
IF APPLIC ABLE: I will ha nd  yo ur e nve lo p e  with yo ur sa ving s to  Lisa  who  will g ive  it to  the  DO 
o nc e  we  ha ve  finishe d  a ll inte rvie ws.  
Ple a se  d o  no t ta lk to  a ny na na y a b o ut the  surve y b e fo re  the  e nd  o f the  c e nte r me e ting . 
 
64
J Description of variables
Variables from the interview
• Part 1
– Cash income: Sum of all income that respondents report to receive in cash, measured
in P . This can include business income, farm income, labor wages, pension, remit-
tances, government aid and other income.
– Non-cash income: Sum of all income that respondents report to receive inmeans other
than cash (e.g. transfer, check), measured in P . This can include business income,
farm income, labor wages, pension, remittances, government aid and other income.
– Money today: Answer to "All in all, how much money will you personally be able to
take home at the end of today?", measured in P .
– Assets: Equally weighted index ranging from zero to one and indicating whether
the household has the following: electricity, running water, radio, television, land-
line telephone, mobile phone, personal computer, refrigerator, washing machine,
CD/DVD player, bicycle, motorcycle and animal-drawn cart.
– Decision making power: Similar to Ashraf et al. (2010), eight questions are asked re-
garding "who decides" in the following situations: What to buy at the market, mak-
ing expensive purchases, giving assistance to family members, recreational use of
money, personal use of money, saving, number of children, schooling of children. If
the husband decides, the item takes the value of zero, one if it is a joint decision and
two if the respondent decides herself. An index is constructed by using the equally
weighted mean of all answers.
– Education: Indicates the level of education completed. Ranging from zero (no formal
education) to eleven (beyond high school education).
– Household size: Number of persons living in the household.
– Business owner: Indicator variable taking the value one if the respondent runs her
own business.
– Time to center: Travel time to center in minutes.
– Travel cost to center: Amount in P that is spent one-way to attend the center meeting.
– Duration of Part 1: Duration of Part 1 measured in minutes from the first question to
the last question before the savings decision.
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• Part 2
– Present bias: Indicator variable taking the value one if choices in the present (today
vs. 2 weeks) are less patient than in the future (in 2 weeks vs. 4 weeks).
– Future bias: Indicator variable taking the value one if choices in the present (today
vs. 2 weeks) are more patient than in the future (in 2 weeks vs. 4 weeks).
– Risk aversion: Index scaled on the interval [0,1] with higher values indicating higher
risk aversion (higher risk aversion implies later switches from lottery A to B).
– Loss aversion: Index scaled on the interval [0,1] with higher values indicating higher
loss aversion (higher loss aversion implies later switches from lottery A to B).
• Part 3
– Money left: "Does your household have money left over at the end of the week after
you have paid for food and other necessities?" encoded as follows: 1-yes, regularly;
2-yes, sometimes; 3-no
– Attention to finances: Two questions from Stango et al. (2017) whether finances would
improve with more attention given to a) day-to-day finances, routine expenses such
as food (short-run attention) and b) medium-run finances, periodic expenses such
as school fees (medium-run attention). Binary indicators are constructed for short-
run attention and medium-run attention that are one if the household is paying
attention to the respective finances.
– Financial literacy: Equally weighted index of correctly answered financial literacy
questions (Questions 1, 2, 3 and 6 from the World Bank’s Financial Literacy Quiz),
scaled to the interval [0,1].
– Narrow bracketing: Two questions adapted from Stango et al. (2017) that are coded
as two indicator variables: "bracketing some" indicates narrow bracketing in at least
one question and "bracketing both" indicates narrow bracketing in both questions.
– Total savings: Sum of the following variables (all measured in P ): savings at home,
savings with the family, formal savings, saving by lending money, savings in the
savings account, savings in the current account (money that remains because the
loan has not yet been fully spent) and savings at cooperatives and other organiza-
tions.
– Savings in ASHI are safe*: Agreement to "Saving at ASHI is not safe".
– Banks untrustworthy*: Agreement to "Banks cannot be trusted".
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– Would like private account*: Agreement to "I wish I had a savings account where I
could hide my money from other".
– Saving less due to...*:
* ...claims from husband: Agreement to "I would save more but my husband needs
the money."
* ...claims from family & friends: Agreement to "If I save, I will only end up giving
the money to my family and friends."
* ...claims from clients: Agreement to "If I have savings with ASHI, I will need to
spend it on abonohan [in-lieu payments] for others."
* ...being over optimistic regarding saving: Agreement to "I always think I would
save the next week, but then I keep postponing it."
* denotes a five-point Likert scale agreement to a specific question. All answers have been
recoded such that higher values represent higher agreement and lie in the interval [0,1].
Variables from administrative data
• PPI score: Ten questions that are being asked when applying for a new loan, e.g. "Do all
children in the family of ages six to 14 go to school?" Answers are converted into points
(e.g. no-0, yes-2, no children in this age range-4) and all points are added. The total
score lies between zero and 100. Country-specific tables permit mapping the score to a
probability of falling below a given poverty line. For instance, a PPI score of 47.5 (sample
mean) indicates a 27 percent chance of being below the US$ 2.50/day/2005 PPP poverty
line and a 77 percent chance of living with less than US$ 3.75 per day in 2005 PPP.
• Main income: Enterprise: Is an indicator variable that takes the value one if the main
income source is an enterprise. Other income sources registered in the data are employ-
ment, farming and fishing.
• House size: is encoded as follows: 0-small, 1-medium, 2-large.
• House strength: is encoded as follows: 0-poor, 1-medium, 2-strong.
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K Setting
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Figure K.1: Study Area
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